# Patent Scenarios

October 15, 2024

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# Scenario 1

- Project "X" = NEW DEVELOPMENT
- RESEARCHER COMES TO YOU VERY EXCITED ABOUT A NEW SUPPLIER
  - "I WANT TO TALK TO THEM ABOUT XXXX THEY HAVE PUBLISHED/MARKETED TO SEE IF IT WILL MEET OUR NEEDS. XXXX MAY SOLVE MAJOR ISSUE WHICH IS HOLDING THE DEVELOPMENT BACK ."
  - "Need to discuss our project with them to find a solution"

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

## Scenario 1
Considerations

- Project "X"
  - Has any information already been Exchanged?
  - Value of this project?
    - Normal Development
    - BET THE FARM
  - Are portions of the development
    - CONFIDENTIAL
    - Patent-Worthy
  - Who is involved in these conversations?
  - Timeline?

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

## Scenario 1
Considerations

- Who is the Partner/3rd Party
  - Size
  - Location
    - US
    - Foreign
  - Commercial Entity
  - Research Organization
  - University
    - PROFESSOR OR STUDENT

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

## Scenario 1
Considerations

- Information
  - Where you are receiving information?
  - Does the information received have value based on the transaction?

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## Scenario 1
Output

- Purchase Order
- Unilateral v. Bilateral Agreement
- Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA)
- Confidential Disclosure Agreement (CDA)
- Secrecy Agreement
- Confidentiality Agreement

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# Scenario 2

- Project "Y" = Use of dataset to develop invention
  - RESEARCHER wants to use a dataset compiled by 3rd Party to develop potential Products
  - "I think this dataset is crucial to the development of invention

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# Scenario 2
## Considerations

- Project "Y"
  - All of questions previously asked
  - How will Data be used?
    - Validation of Method
    - Development of Method
    - Is the information necessary for another reason?
      - Regulatory Filing

# Scenario 2
## Considerations

- Project "Y"
  - Will Patent-Worthy inventions result?
  - What is the value of any potential inventions related to the data?
  - How much value does this dataset add?

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# Scenario 2
## Considerations

- Who is the 3rd Party
- Relationship
  - Do we already have an established relationship?
  - Is this a one-time issue or will it continue?

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## Scenario 2
Considerations

- What do we need in order to commercialize
  - Freedom to operate
  - Exclusivity
  - Ownership
- What does 3rd party Need
  - Ownership
  - Freedom to Operate
  - Licensing

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## Scenario 2
Output

- Development Agreements
- Data Sharing Agreements
- Clinical Trial Agreements
- Licensing Agreements

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

# Scenario 3

- Project "Z" = Working with 3rd Party Expert
  - RESEARCHER wants to work with External Expert to develop and/or improve a product
  - " this expert is at the top of the field and can really take our product to next level"

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

# Scenario 3
## Considerations

- Project "Z"
  - What is the value of any potential contribution from 3rd Party to development/design?

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

# Scenario 3
## Considerations

- Who is the 3rd Party
  - Conflicts of interest
- Relationship
  - Do we already have an established relationship?
  - Is this a one-time issue or will it continue?
- Where are they located?
- Where will work be taking place?

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

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  - Freedom to Operate
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

# Scenario 3
## Considerations

- Ownership
  - Joint
  - Single side ownership
  - License to other side for internal use, etc.
  - Concurrent development that will not lead to joint IP
    - if same idea developed separately

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

## Scenario 3
Output

- Joint Development Agreement
- Collaboration Agreement

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# Scenario 4 - Supplier

- Joint Development – Supplier and your Company
  - Work to develop API based on your Company's knowledge/data
    - Supplier brings to scale
      - Inventorship/ownership on improvements to manufacture
      - Inventorship/ownership of improvements to compound (e.g., salt selection, polymorph selection)
    - Supplier wants to sell to 3rd Parties with a version of your API
      - E.g., different salt or different polymorph

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


# Points to Ponder

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# Points to Ponder

## Patents

- The only constant is change
- Don’t judge too harshly
  - Circumstances may have demanded compromise

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Role of Attorney
  - Fact Gathering
  - Issue spotting
  - Risk determination
- Remember - Essential terms of agreement come from the business
    - Attorneys Memorialize Agreed to terms
    - Attorney don't give permission for business to move forward – just risk assessment

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# Points to Ponder

## Patents

- Need to have an understanding of:
  - Business of both parties
  - Goal of agreement
  - Risks & Values
  - Essential Elements & Sacrificial Lambs
    - Rights
    - Control
    - Ownership

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- What does Client/Internal Partner need?
  - Freedom to Operate
  - Exclusivity
  - Collaboration
    - Long-term
    - One and done

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Client/Internal Partner Considerations
  - Project Importance
    - Program
    - Specific value of Project
    - Relationship between parties

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

## Client/Internal Partner Considerations

- Who should be involved in determining the terms of the agreement & When?
  - Business Unit
  - Scientist
    - Some points of conflict may be better understood by scientists/technicians familiar with technology
  - Attorneys
    - Inside v. Outside Counsel
    - IP, Operations (Supply Chain), Licensing

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Client/Internal Partner Considerations
  - Who are the champions
    - Decision Maker
    - Ensuring message conformity within internal team
  - Signature Authority
    - Does the person you are dealing with have authority to bind the company in this way?

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


# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Client/Internal Partner Considerations
  - Where is the associated work occurring?
    - If IP develops – some countries require you to file first in that country
      - United States (Foreign Filing License)
      - China – If completed in China – first filing should be in China
      - France
    - Foreign Filing Licenses
    - Ownership Provisions

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


# Points to Ponder

## Patents

- Client/Internal Partner Considerations
  - Ownership Provisions
    - Location matters
    - Payments to Inventors

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Client/Internal Partner Considerations
  - Who is doing the work?
    - Specialists

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Are other 3rd parties involved?
- Funding?
  - Is any external funding being used?
    - Government, NGO, or Consortiums
    - March in rights
    - Ownership issues




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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Client/Internal Partner needs to:
  - Document what you know
    - Prior to collaboration
    - From collaboration
    - From other sources

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


# Points to Ponder

## Patents

- Partner
  - Relationship
  - Location
  - Size
  - Finances
  - Sensitivity to Publicity
    - Are they willing to go for an injunction?
  - What are they offering?
  - Internal partners – who & Positions
  - Legacy IP

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


# Points to Ponder

Patents

## Partner Limitations

- Statutory Limitations on what can be agreed to
  - Universities
    - Professor or Students - Post-doctoral students
  - State Agencies
  - Federal Agencies
- Understand Rules of Engagement
  - Ownership Restrictions
  - Representations and Warranties

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Royalties – who will track this?
  - Do you have a system in place for ensuring
    - IP is in force?
    - Follow-on IP is addressed
    - Contracts are up to date and not in conflict?
  - Upfront
  - Milestone
  - Long-term
- Termination
- Contacts
  - How and who?

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# Points to Ponder

## Patents

- Choice of Law and Venue
  - Choice of Law = Law that Governs Rights Under Agreement
  - Choice of Venue = Place Where Dispute to Be Resolved
- Silence
  - Parties may choose not to address this issue in the Agreement
- Perspectives Based on Party's Location, and Whether to Align or Not Align With Jurisdiction of Choice of Law
  - Considerations When Venue and Choice of Law Jurisdiction Align
  - Considerations When Venue Different From Choice of Law Jurisdiction
  - Trying to Align Similar Legal Systems When Non-Alignment of Venue and Choice of Law Jurisdiction

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Does the Choice of Venue Clause act as an exclusion for special "Venues or Courts"
  - PTAB
  - ITC
  - EPO
  - Individual Country Nullity/Opposition Proceedings

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# Points to Ponder

Patents

- Start with the End in Mind
  - What is Business trying to accomplish?

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# Patent Transactions: a view from the "inside"

Nicole Woods

Associate VP, Assistant General Patent Counsel – Clinical/Regulatory Strategist and PRC Lead

Eli Lilly and Company

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# Pharmaceuticals are COMPLEX



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





# Patent Transactions
# <u>Do NOT</u> Need to be Complex

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The "Right" Way …

"It Depends"

The "Proper" Terms …

No One Size Fits All Solution

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# Game of Chess

1. Understand the "Board": Client's & "Opponent's" Business
2. Understand the "Game": GOAL of the Agreement
3. Understand Business Drivers: Risks & Values
4. Understand what is Essential and what can be Sacrificed: Rights, Control, Ownership, *etc*.

# Key Considerations


- Multiple sides
- Varying interests
- One sided consideration will preclude deals

- Business strategy
- Not one size ≠ Fit all
- Freedom to Operate

- Benefit & Value
- Risk severity
- Likelihood of risk

# Practical Tips

- Be reasonable
- Freedom to Operate (FTO) = Very Important Principle (VIP)
- Fit business strategy
- Rights needed will vary
- Further science and advance Products that matter

# Intellectual Property in University and Government Contracts

NYIPLA October 2024 Presentation

# Speaker Biographies

- Jennifer Mandina Wiss is a contract negotiator at the University of Buffalo focused on industry engagement. She has a BA in English, minor in Accounting; a JD with a concentration in Financing Transaction; and an MS in Biomedical Engineering.
- Richard Kurz is a partner at Haug Partners LLP who focuses on intellectual property litigation and counselling. His litigation experience includes patent infringement, inventorship, business torts, and breach of contract claims. He also counsels clients concerning due diligence and freedom to operate matters, and for negotiating and drafting settlement, licensing, and collaboration agreements.
- Ankur Parekh has been a practicing attorney for over 15 years. He is currently Senior IP Counsel for the Raytheon Division of RTX Corporation. He previously worked as IP counsel for the Pratt & Whitney division of Raytheon Technologies and for Legrand, a multinational conglomerate focused on electrical infrastructure and building automation. Ankur started his legal career practicing IP litigation and IP counseling at law firms in New York City.

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# Agenda

- Ownership and rights to IP created by universities and in the performance of government contracts
- Technology Transfer by Universities
- Additional Agreements Used By Universities Containing IP Terms
- Some Advanced IP Topics in Government Contracting
- Updates on March-In Rights

# IP Ownership and Rights  Created During University Sponsored Research and During Federally Funded R&D

- Primary forms of IP created: inventions, technical data (proprietary information, trade secrets), and software
- University research can be sponsored by the U.S. Government or a private organization
- When university research is sponsored by a private organization, the IP rights are determined by an agreement
  - Generally, the university will own the IP it solely creates
  - Generally, the private organization will get a license of a scope determined through negotiation (or selection from a list of options)
- Comparison: R&D by a private corporation can be funded by the U.S. government or at private expense (IR&D)

# University SRAs

- SRA = Sponsored Research Agreement
- Sponsored Research Agreements are used whenever our industry partners engage with us for research.
- UB offers three different options from which to begin negotiations. All are designed to answer questions about IP. The three options are:
  - Exclusive option to negotiate license terms to any resultant IP
  - Pre-negotiate terms to any potential resultant IP
  - Exclusive license to any resultant IP
- SRAs:
  - Clarify the work that will be performed and its related deliverables
  - Have a clearly defined budget and milestones
  - Negotiate sponsor's rights to pre-publication review to identify any sponsor proprietary information and any disclosed inventions for which a pre-publication patent application filing may be warranted.

# How Corporations Think about Sponsoring University Research

- Corporations generally like to use universities for basic research / early-stage technology development
- Many universities today offer to later-stage technology development at a lower cost than commercial vendors
- While the lower cost may be attractive to some at the corporation, counsel must advise the corporation on many issues presented by this approach

# Issues Presented by Using University for Later Stage Development

- Universities will generally own the IP they create
- Unlike a commercial vendor, a university will generally not agree to any warranties, indemnities, or carveouts to a consequential-damages waiver
- Many universities demand indemnification from the corporation for any liability they experience from the corporation's use of the research results
- Universities are generally unwilling or, in the case of state universities, unable to negotiate choice of law, choice of venue, and ADR options
- Many universities will not work with ITAR technical data
- Universities will often not agree to long protection periods for any company background proprietary information that the company needs to disclose for the development work

# CRADAs for Universities

- CRADA = Collaborative Research and Development Agreement
- CRADAs are used to whenever two institutions are working together to perform in-kind research
- It is a standard that the institution that is primarily driving the research supplies the CRADA
- CRADAs:
  - Clearly define each investigators contribution
  - Permit joint and sole publications
  - Resolve IP ownership

# IP Created in the Performance of U.S. Government Contracts

- Inventions
  - Federal procurement of R&D – governed by the Bayh-Dole Act (and March-in Rights)
  - CRADA w/ government – subject to terms of agreement
- Technical Data / Software
  - Federal procurement of R&D – governed by FAR (and DFARS) and SBIR Act
  - Cooperative w/ government – subject to terms of agreement (CRADA)
  - Generally
    - Contractor owns the technical data and software it creates, even when developed at exclusively at government expense
    - U.S. Government gets a license to the technical data / software it creates with federal funding or otherwise delivers to U.S. Government in performance of the contract; license scope varies

# Bayh-Dole Act

- Codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; implementing regulations at 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.1–401.17
- Under Bayh-Dole, the Contractor can elect title to the inventions it creates during Federally funded R&D
- U.S. Government gets a broad license to practice and have practiced the invention for government purposes
- Bayh-Dole was a sea change when it was enacted in 1980; prior to Bayh-Dole, U.S. government owned all inventions created during Federally funded R&D and it licensed only a small percentage of them

# Bayh-Dole Act – Some Major Requirements

- Contractor must:
  - Report subject inventions to the U.S. Government within 2 months the inventor's submission of a written invention disclosure;
  - elect title to those inventions within 2 years of disclosure to the agency;
  - timely file patent application;
  - timely inform U.S. Government of intention not to file a patent application or continue prosecution of patent application; and
  - contractually require employees to disclose inventions created during federally funded R&D and to assign those inventions to the employer.
- Any exclusive licensee of the right to use or sell the invention in the United States must agree that articles embodying the invention are **substantially manufactured in the United States** (35 U.S.C. § 204).

# 35 U.S.C. § 203 March-In Rights

- U.S. Government can force the granting of licenses, if:
  - patent owner has not made sufficient efforts to commercialize the invention;
  - action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs;
  - action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or
  - holder of exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States has either not agreed to or is in breach of its agreement to require substantial manufacture of articles embodying the invention in the United States.

# 2023 NIST March-in Rights Proposal

- According to the RFI promulgated by NIST:
- "**To date, no agency has exercised its right to march-in**."
- "Several agencies have considered march-in previously but have either declined to exercise it or worked with the parties to find an alternative solution to achieve the desired objectives."
- "**March-in is an important tool for agencies**, but that tool is accompanied by potentially significant positive and negative ramifications."
- "The exercise of march-in rights is just one tool that may be available to the government and **use of march-in should be considered in the context of all tools at the agency's disposal to address situations**."

See https://www.regulations.gov/document/NIST-2023-0008-0001 (emphasis added)

# NIST March-in Rights Proposal – Criterion 1

- **Agency action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such field of use**.
- "If the contractor or licensee has commercialized the product, but **the price or other terms at which the product is currently offered to the public are not reasonable**, agencies may need to further assess whether march-in is warranted."
- "Whether action may be needed to meet the needs of the Government or protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of the subject invention may include consideration of **factors that unreasonably limit availability of the invention to the public**, including the **reasonableness of the price** and other **terms at which the product is made available** to end-users."

See https://www.regulations.gov/document/NIST-2023-0008-0001 (emphasis added)

# NIST March-in Rights Proposal – Criterion 2

- **Agency action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees**.
- "Is the contractor or the licensee **exploiting a health or safety need** in order to set a **product price that is extreme and unjustified** given the totality of circumstances?"
- "For example, has the contractor or licensee implemented a sudden, steep price increase in response to a disaster that is putting people's health at risk?"
- "It should be noted that in reviewing this question, **the agency is not limited to reviewing price increases; the initial price may also be considered if it appears that the price is extreme, unjustified, and exploitative of a health or safety need**."

See https://www.regulations.gov/document/NIST-2023-0008-0001 (emphasis added)

# Déjà vu All over Again: The NIH Previously Tried to Use "Reasonable Pricing" Requirements in Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs)

- In Fiscal Years 1990 – 1995, the NIH incorporated what it termed a "reasonable pricing" clause into its CRADAs, under which "a company taking an exclusive license to bring an NIH invention to market could be compelled by the NIH to submit documentation showing a 'reasonable relationship between the pricing of the product, the public investment in that product, and the health and safety needs of the public.'"
- The NIH stopped this experiment in Fiscal Year 1995 by removing the "reasonable pricing" clause from its CRADAs when it became clear that the "the pricing clause has driven industry away from potentially beneficial scientific collaborations."

See, e.g., The NIH Experience with the Reasonable Pricing Clause in CRADAs FY1990-1995, https://www.techtransfer.nih.gov/sites/default/files/CRADA%20Q%26A%20Nov%202021%20FINAL.pdf; NIH News, https://www.techtransfer.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/NIH-Notice-Rescinding-Reasonable-Pricing-Clause.pdf

# Ownership/Rights in Technical Data / Software Created/Delivered During Federally Funded R&D

- Contractor will generally own the technical data/software it creates, and U.S. Government gets a nonexclusive license
- U.S. Government's rights in such technical data / software for Federal Procurement of R&D under FAR 15
  - Scope of rights
    - Unlimited Rights
    - Limited/Restricted Rights
    - Government Purpose Rights (defense contracts only)
    - Specifically Negotiated License Rights
    - Commercial Rights
  - Expense determinations made at lowest practicable level
  - Contractor must assert data rights that are more restrictive than unlimited rights
  - Data/software must be properly marked when delivered to the U.S. Government

# Ownership/Rights in Technical Data / Software Created/Delivered During Performance of SBIR Contract

- U.S. Government gets unlimited rights in background IP that contractor delivers to it
  - Contractors should endeavor to deliver form, fit, function data instead of valuable background IP
- U.S. Government gets SBIR data rights in data/software created by contractor during performance of the SBIR contract
  - SBIR data rights is similar to limited/restricted rights data except there is a fixed time period of protection, which is up to 20 years

# Ownership/Rights in Technical Data / Software Created/Delivered During Performance of Cooperative R&D

- U.S. Government will **not** disclose proprietary background IP it receives from private research partner to third parties
- U.S. Government will **not** disclose new data / software created by the private research partner during the collaboration and potentially certain new data / software that the government's employees create during the collaboration for up to **five** years (longer protection periods can be authorized)

# TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BY UNIVERSITIES

# Technology Transfer: What Is It?

- ***General Definition***: Dissemination of skills, knowledge and technology to another party for some benefit
- **Specific Definition**: University Technology Transfer extends the benefit provided through federal funding by moving research closer to commercialization.
- This function is traditionally viewed as the patenting, marketing, and licensing University technologies.

# Licenses

- Licenses are used to transfer commercialization rights of university intellectual property to an industry partner
- It is a standard that the organization that owns the technology drafts the license
- Standard license terms include milestones, royalties, liability, and indemnification provisions
- Because many university technologies are early stage, many of them are licensed to start ups and UB has a specific licensing program for faculty start ups.

# UB Invention Lifecycle

- New Technology Disclosure (“NTD”)
- Report to sponsor
  - Federal, Institution, Corporation
- Assessments
  - Intellectual Property and Market Opportunity
- Elect title (Federal) and Inventor assignment
- File for patent/copyright
- Marketing/Customer Discovery
- Licensing

# Technology Transfer Assessment

## *Lab to Market*

- **Strength of intellectual property protection**
- Novelty, non-obviousness, usefulness, enablement
- Type: Composition, Device, Process
- Enforcement (detection and cost/benefit)
- Design around
- **Commercial opportunity**
- Solves a significant problem in the market
- Defined customer
- Sustainable competitive advantages
- Size and growth of the potential market
- **Stage of development**
- Investment and risk



**Risk**

- Technical
- Intellectual Property
- Regulatory
- Market
- Financial

# OTHER AGREEMENTS THAT ADDRESS IP ISSUES

# MTAs

- MTA = Material Transfer Agreement
- MTAs are used to memorialize the transfer materials between organizations
- It is a standard that the organization providing the material will supply the MTA
- If the material is not properly brought in:
  - Transfer of material not permitted until resolved
  - Creates question of ownership on inventions
  - Liability/Indemnification

# CDAs = NDAs = PIAs

- CDA = Confidential Disclosure Agreement
- NDA = Nondisclosure Agreement
- PIA = Proprietary Information Agreement
- CDAs provide the terms under which confidential information may be exchanged
- It is a standard that the organization providing the confidential information will supply the CDA
- If the information is exchanged without an agreement:
  - May be a publication for patenting purposes – may bar patent protection
  - No limitations on use
  - Liability/Indemnification

# IIAs

- IIA = Inter-Institutional Agreement
- IIAS are used whenever investigators from more than one entity contribute to an invention.
- It is a standard that the institution that will be responsible for leading the licensing efforts supplies the IIA.
- IIAs:
  - Define the roles of each institution
  - Determine control of patent process
  - Determine financial contribution to patent costs
  - Determine royalty split
  - List required terms of any license

# TAs/SAs

- TA = Testing Agreement
- SA = Services Agreement
- TAs and SAs are used when an organization is using university equipment/employees to conduct standard testing or services.
- Industry prefers to start from their template, all other organizations defer to the service/testing provider.
- TAs and SAs:
  - Specify the work to be performed, as dictated by the entity ordering the test/service
  - Give ownership of the results to the contracting party
  - Are generally silent on IP

# SOME ADVANCED IP TOPICS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING

# Authorization & Consent (28 U.S.C. § 1498)

- Most government procurement contracts under FAR 15 have an A&C clause
  - Not always included in other government contracts, such as OTAs, CRADAs, SBIR agreements, etc.
- Under A&C, a contractor can infringe a U.S. patent in its performance of a government contract without liability to the patent owner
  - Limited exception in production contracts for manufacturing procedures or equipment not required to perform the contract
- Patent owner can sue the U.S. Government for the infringement, but the only remedy is reasonable monetary compensation
  - Injunctive relief is not available
  - Suit must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims
- A&C is an application of eminent domain and sovereign immunity
  - Government is "taking" a sublicenseable license under the patent for just compensation and limiting where it can be sued
- A&C does not apply to foreign patents
  - Suit against a foreign subcontractor for infringement of a foreign patent still available
  - Most developed nations have their own version of A&C

# Government Contracting vs. Private Contracting

- Private contracting – two parties exercising their freedom to contract to reach any deal they can agree to
- Government contracting – a private contractor negotiating with a government contracting officer who is constrained by laws and regulations as to the scope of the deal
- Private contracting – the deal is governed by the "four corners" of the contract; extrinsic evidence is not admissible unless the contract language is ambiguous
- Government contracting – language that does not appear in the contract can be read into it as a matter of law
  - *Christian doctrine - G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States*, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
  - Contract clauses that express a "deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy" are incorporated by operation of law
  - Government contracts have more than four corners!
  - Does it apply to Bayh-Dole and data-rights framework in FAR/DFARS?

# QUESTIONS?

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Mr. Gormakh is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, where he teaches Professional Responsibility. He has lectured at multiple law schools and bar associations, including the New York State Academy of Trial Lawyers; and he has authored, co-authored, and assisted in the preparation of CLE materials on legal ethics issues.

Mr. Gormakh's practice includes providing proactive guidance on the application of ethical rules to the day-to-day practice of law, and the firm regularly provides outside professional responsibility counsel to multiple AM100 law firms. As part of his practice, Mr. Gormakh also represents law firms in fee dispute matters. In addition, Mr. Gormakh has extensive experience assisting law school graduates in connection with bar admission matters and attorneys seeking reinstatement to practice law after suspension or disbarment.

Mr. Gormakh is a member of the Professional Discipline Committee of the New York City Bar Association, the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, and the New York State Academy of Trial Lawyers.

Mr. Gormakh joined the Law Offices of Michael S. Ross in 2009 and earned his JD/MBA from Western New England University School of Law in 2012. While in law school, Mr. Gormakh served as a law clerk at the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts. Mr. Gormakh is admitted to practice in New York, before the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The New York Intellectual Property Law Association

PRESENTS

# IP TRANSACTIONS BOOTCAMP: Ethics and AI

**Eugene Gormakh, Esq.**
Law Offices of Michael S. Ross

# Ethics and AI: Introduction

- AI operates by recognizing and generating patterns based on training data and user input, and then converting those patterns into language.
- The New York Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to be **competent**, **diligent**, and to **communicate effectively** with clients.
- The Rules prohibit "**excessive fees**." In the marketplace, AI is impacting what that means.
  - Clients asking: would it be cheaper to use AI for this?
  - Clients asking whether AI can do a better job at large-scale discovery and cost less.
  - Lawyers asking: if I can only do a submarginally better job than AI at a task, does the client have to pay me for it?

# ABA Formal Op. 512 (2024)

- **American Bar Association Formal Opinion 512**, issued on July 29, 2024, addressed "Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools" ("AI" or "GAI"). At page 1, the Opinion notes:
  - "In the realm of analytics, AI also can help lawyers **predict how judges might rule on a legal question** based on data about the judge's rulings; discover the **summary judgment grant rate** for every federal district judge; or **evaluate how parties and lawyers may behave in current litigation based on their past conduct in similar litigation**. And for basic legal research, AI may enhance lawyers' search results."

# AI Can Make Mistakes

- Lawyers have been sanctioned for using AI-generated information that was inaccurate. *See Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, 22-cv-1461 (SDNY) (Jun. 22, 2023).
- AI is in its infancy. Research shows that all AI tools can "hallucinate." *See also* V. Magesh, *et al*, *Hallucination Free? Assessing the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools*, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (June 26, 2024):
  - "While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time."

# How does the issue of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC impact on the use of AI?

- Rule 1.6 - "A lawyer shall not knowingly reveal **confidential information**...."
  - ""Confidential information' consists of information gained during or relating to the representation of a client, whatever its source, that is **(a)** protected by the attorney-client privilege, **(b)** likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, or **(c)** information that the client has requested be kept confidential."
- ChatGPT: https://openai.com/policies/row-privacy-policy/
  - "User Content: When you use our Services, we collect Personal Information that is included in the input, file uploads, or feedback that you provide to our Services…."
  - "Communication Information: If you communicate with us, we collect your name, contact information, and the contents of any messages you send…"

# How does the issue of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 of the NYRPC impact on the use of AI?

- **ABA Formal Op. 512 (p. 7):** "because many of today's self-learning GAI tools are designed so that their output could lead directly or indirectly to the disclosure of information relating to the representation of a client, **a client's informed consent is required prior to inputting information relating to the representation into such a GAI tool**."
- "To obtain informed consent when using a GAI tool, merely adding general, boiler-plate provisions to engagement letters purporting to authorize the lawyer to use GAI is not sufficient." *Id.*
- Hard to evaluate the risk due to uncertainty. *Id.*
- Client consent is not required to use AI for "idea generation" so long as confidential information is not being disclosed. *Id.*

# Are there modalities of AI which can minimize confidentiality-related risks?

- **Sandbox/custom AI** solutions may **reduce risk**. However:
  - AI may disclose confidential information it learns to persons **outside the firm** who are using the same AI tool.
  - AI may disclose information it learns to persons **in the firm**:
    1. Who either are **prohibited from access** to said information because of an ethical screen, or
    2. Who could **inadvertently use** the information from one client to help another client, not understanding that the lawyer is revealing client confidences.

*See* ABA Formal Op. 512 (p. 7).

# In what way is the "duty to communicate" with clients impacted by the use of AI?

- Where **Rule 1.6** does not require informed consent, it is important to consider whether **Rule 1.4** requires disclosing the use of a GAI tool in the representation.
- **Rule 1.4** governs the duty to communicate and provides that a lawyer *shall*:
  - **reasonably consult** with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished (Rule 1.4(a)(2)); and
  - **explain a matter** to the extent reasonably **necessary** to permit the client to make **informed decisions** regarding the representation (Rule 1.4(b)).

# What are the "diligence" (Rule 1.3) and "competence" (Rule 1.1) mandates impacted by AI?

- You must have a reasonable understanding of the benefits and risks of AI as it develops. *See* ABA Formal Op. 512.
- Can you rely on an AI that you previously tested?
- "Emerging technologies may provide an output that is of **distinctively higher quality** than current GAI tools produce, or may enable lawyers to perform work **markedly faster and more economically**, eventually becoming **ubiquitous** in legal practice and establishing conventional expectations regarding lawyers' duty of competence." *Id.*

# What are the "diligence" (Rule 1.3) and "competence" (Rule 1.1) mandates impacted by AI?

- ABA Formal Op. 512 at n.20, citing Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan, *Gandy Dancers on the Web: How the Internet Has Raised the Bar on Lawyers' Professional Responsibility to Research and Know the Law*, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 607, 608 (2000)

> "The lawyer in the twenty-first century who does not effectively use the Internet for legal research may fall short of the minimal standards of professional competence and be potentially liable for malpractice"

# Are lawyers "obligated" to become familiar with and use AI pursuant to Rules 1.1 and 1.3 and by fee-related issues raised by Rule 1.5(a) prohibiting charging "excessive" fees?

- **Rule 1.1(a):** "A lawyer should provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
- **Rule 1.3(a):** "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."
- **Rule 1.5:** prohibiting "excessive" fees.

# Are lawyers "obligated" to become familiar with and use AI pursuant to Rules 1.1 and 1.3 and by fee-related issues raised by Rule 1.5(a) prohibiting charging "excessive" fees?

- Clients **negotiate down costs** and will expect AI to reduce costs.
  - Get ahead of the issue.
  - Can a client accept the risk of ineffective counsel to save money?
  - Is there a duty to explore options to lower legal costs under Rule 1.5?
- Can you compete with AI by being "hands on" in discovery?
- What will best serve the clients?

**THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION**
**COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS**

# FORMAL OPINION 2024-5: ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS RELATING TO THE USE OF GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

**TOPIC:** The use of generative artificial intelligence by New York lawyers, law firms, legal departments, government law offices and legal assistance organizations.

**DIGEST:** This opinion provides general guidance on the use of tools that use generative artificial intelligence.

**RULES:** **1.1, 1.2(d), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 3.1, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 7.1, 7.3, 8.4**

**QUESTION:** The availability of tools to assist lawyers in their practice that employ generative artificial intelligence has been dramatically expanding and continues to grow. What are the ethical issues that lawyers should consider when deciding whether to use these tools and, if the decision is made to do so, how to use them?

**OPINION:** When using generative artificial intelligence tools, a lawyer should take into account the duty of confidentiality, the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest, the duty of competence and diligence, the rules governing advertising and solicitation, the duty to comply with the law, the duty to supervise both lawyers and non-lawyers, the duty of subordinate attorneys, the duty to consult with clients, the duty of candor to tribunals, the prohibition on making non-meritorious claims and contentions, the limitations on what a lawyer may charge for fees and costs, and the prohibition on discrimination.

## Introduction

Generative artificial intelligence ("Generative AI"), like any technology, must be used in a manner that comports with a lawyer's ethical obligations. General-purpose technology platforms offer AI chatbots. Legal research platforms tout "legal generative AI" that can draft, analyze documents, and provide legal citations. Even data management vendors offer Generative AI-assisted review, analytic, and visualization capabilities. This summary of currently available tools will likely soon be outdated because of the rapid evolution of Generative AI. This guidance, therefore, is general. We expect that this advice will be updated and supplemented in years to come to cover issues not yet anticipated.

This Opinion provides guidance on the ethical obligations of lawyers and law firms relating to the use of Generative AI. It follows and is consistent with the format used by the Practical Guidance for the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law released by the California State Bar's Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct in November 2023.[1] This

[1] State Bar of Cal., Standing Comm. on Pro. Resp. & Conduct, *Practical Guidance for the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law* (Nov. 16. 2023) ("California Guidance"),

Opinion is in the same format as the California State Bar's guidance and contains multiple quotations from that guidance. Like the California State Bar and other bar associations that have addressed Generative AI,[2] we believe that when addressing developing areas, lawyers need guardrails and not hard-and-fast restrictions or new rules that could stymie developments. By including advice specifically based on New York Rules and practice, this Opinion is intended to be helpful to the New York Bar.

| Applicable Authorities | New York Guidance |
|---|---|
| **Duty of Confidentiality**<br>Rule 1.6 | Generative AI systems are able to use information that is inputted, including prompts, uploaded data, documents, and other resources, to train AI. They may also share inputted information with third parties or use it for other purposes.[3] Even if a system does not use or share inputted information, it may lack "reasonable or adequate security."[4]<br><br>Without client consent, a lawyer must not input confidential client information into any Generative AI system that will share the inputted confidential information with third parties.[5] Even with consent, a lawyer should "avoid entering details that can be used to identify the client."[6] Consent is not needed if no confidential client information is shared, for example through anonymization of client information. Generative AI systems that keep inputted information entirely within the firm's own protected databases, sometimes called "closed" |

https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ethics/Generative-AI-Practical-Guidance.pdf; *see also* Am. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 512 (2024); Fla. Bar Bd. Rev. Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Op. 24-1 (2024); D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 388 (April 2024); N.J. STATE BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) AND THE LAW: REPORT, REQUESTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FINDINGS (2024), https://njsba.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/NJSBA-TASK-FORCE-ON-AI-AND-THE-LAW-REPORT-final.pdf; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2024), https://www.nycbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/20221290_AI_NYS_Judiciary.pdf. (All websites last accessed on Aug. 5, 2024).

[2] In general, this Opinion is consistent with the ABA, California Bar, Florida Bar, District of Columbia Bar, and New Jersey Bar opinions cited in Footnote 1. However, the New York State Bar suggests adoption of certain rules to address Generative AI, which we believe is premature because of the rapid pace of technological development and change. *See, e.g.*, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, *supra*, at 53–56.

[3] Generative AI systems that share inputted information with third parties are sometimes called "open" systems.

[4] California Guidance at 2.

[5] Lawyers may wish to obtain advance client consent to use Generative AI that will involve sharing of client information, but, because such consent must be knowing, the client must understand the potential consequences of such information-sharing for the consent to be effective. *See* N.Y. State Op. 1020 ¶ 10 (a lawyer "may post and share documents using a 'cloud' data storage tool" that does not provide "reasonable protection to confidential client information" only where "the lawyer obtains informed consent from the client after advising the client of the relevant risks").

[6] *Id.*

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| | systems, do not present these risks. But a lawyer must not input any confidential information of the client into any Generative AI system that lacks adequate confidentiality and security protections, regardless of whether the system uses or shares inputted information, unless the client has given informed consent to the lawyer's doing so. Even with closed systems, a lawyer must take care that confidential information is not improperly shared with other persons at or clients of the same law firm, including persons who are prohibited access to the information because of an ethical wall.[7]<br><br>A lawyer or law firm[8] should "consult with IT professionals or cybersecurity experts to the extent necessary for the lawyer or law firm to ensure that any Generative AI system in which a lawyer would input confidential client information adheres to stringent security, confidentiality, and data retention protocols."[9]<br><br>A lawyer should review the system's Terms of Use. "A lawyer who intends to use confidential information in a Generative AI product should ensure that the provider does not share inputted information with third parties or use the information for its own use in any manner, including to train or improve its product," again without informed client consent.[10] Terms of Use can change frequently and a lawyer's obligation to understand the system's use of inputs is continuing. Accordingly, lawyers should periodically monitor Terms of Use or other information to learn about any changes that might compromise confidential information.[11]<br><br>A law firm may wish to consider implementing policies and control procedures to regulate the use of confidential client information in Generative AI systems if the law firm is going to make use of such systems. |
| **Conflicts of Interest** | Where a Generative AI system uses client information, a law firm must ensure that the system implements any ethical screens required under the Rules. For example, if an ethical |

[7] *See* Am. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 512 at 6-7 (2024).

[8] Consistent with Rule 1.0(h), in this Opinion "law firm" includes a private firm as well as qualified legal assistance organizations, government law offices and corporations, and other entities' legal departments.

[9] California Guidance at 2.

[10] *Id.*

[11] *See* N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, *supra*, at 58.

| | |
|---|---|
| Rule 1.7; Rule 1.8; Rule 1.9; Rule 1.10; Rule 1.11; Rule 1.12 | screen excludes a lawyer from any information or documents with respect to a client, the lawyer must be not exposed to such information or documents through the law firm's Generative AI systems. |
| **Duties of Competence and Diligence**<br><br>Rule 1.1; Rule 1.3 | A lawyer should be aware that currently Generative AI outputs may include historical information that is false, inaccurate, or biased.<br><br>"A lawyer must ensure the competent use of technology, including the associated benefits and risks, and apply diligence and prudence with respect to facts and law."[12]<br><br>"Before selecting and using a Generative AI tool, a lawyer should understand to a reasonable degree how the technology works, its limitations, and the applicable [T]erms of [U]se and other policies governing the use and exploitation of client data by the product."[13] A lawyer may wish to consider acquiring skills through a continuing legal education course. Consultation with IT professionals or cybersecurity experts may be appropriate as well.<br><br>Generative AI outputs may be used as a starting point but must be carefully scrutinized. They should be critically analyzed for accuracy and bias, supplemented, and improved, if necessary. A lawyer must ensure that the input is correct and then critically review, validate, and correct the output of Generative AI "to ensure the content accurately reflects and supports the interests and priorities of the client in the matter at hand, including as part of advocacy for the client. The duty of competence requires more than the mere detection and elimination of false [Generative AI] outputs."[14]<br><br>The use of Generative AI tools without the application of trained judgment by a lawyer is inconsistent with the competent and diligent practice of law. "A lawyer's professional judgment cannot be delegated to [G]enerative AI and remains the lawyer's responsibility at all times. A lawyer should take steps to avoid overreliance on Generative AI to such a degree that it hinders critical attorney analysis |

[12] California Guidance at 2. There have been claims that certain Generative AI tools violate intellectual property rights of third parties. A lawyer planning to use a Generative AI tool should keep abreast of whether there are any such risks associated with the tool the lawyer plans to use.

[13] *Id.*

[14] *Id.* at 3.

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| | fostered by traditional research and writing. For example, a lawyer must supplement any Generative AI-generated research with human-performed research and supplement any Generative AI-generated argument with critical, human-performed analysis and review of authorities."[15] |
| **Advertising and Solicitation**<br>Rule 7.1; Rule 7.3 | Lawyers must not use Generative AI in a way that would circumvent their responsibilities under the Rules regarding marketing and solicitation. For example, a lawyer must not use Generative AI to make false statements, to search the internet for potential clients and send solicitations that would otherwise be prohibited under the Rules, or to pose as a real person to communicate with prospective clients. |
| **Duty to Comply with the Law**<br>Rule 8.4; Rule 1.2(d) | "There are many relevant and applicable legal issues surrounding [G]enerative AI, including but not limited to compliance with AI-specific laws, privacy laws, cross-border data transfer laws, intellectual property laws, and cybersecurity concerns."[16] A lawyer must comply with the law and cannot counsel a client to engage in, or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is, a violation of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal when using Generative AI tools. |
| **Duty to Supervise Lawyers and Nonlawyers, Responsibilities of Subordinate Lawyers**<br>Rule 5.1; Rule 5.2; Rule 5.3; Rule 8.4 | "Managerial and supervisory lawyers should establish clear policies regarding the permissible uses of [G]enerative AI and make reasonable efforts to ensure that the law firm adopts measures that give reasonable assurance that the law firm's lawyers and non-lawyers' conduct complies with their professional obligations when using [G]enerative AI. This includes providing training on the ethical and practical aspects, and pitfalls, of [G]enerative AI use.<br><br>A subordinate lawyer must not use Generative AI at the direction of a supervisory lawyer in a manner that violates the subordinate lawyer's professional responsibility and obligations."[17] A subordinate lawyer should disclose to a supervisory lawyer the use of Generative AI that is not generally understood to be routinely used by lawyers.[18] |

[15] *Id.*

[16] *Id.*

[17] *Id.*

[18] Likewise, where a client provides citations to a lawyer, a lawyer must review the decisions to make sure that they are genuine and properly cited. *See United States v. Cohen*, No. 18-CR-602, 2024 WL 1193604 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,

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| | A lawyer using a Generative AI chatbot for client intake purposes must adequately supervise the chatbot.[19] A high degree of supervision may be required if there is a likelihood that ethical problems may arise. For example, a chatbot may fail to disclose that it is not a lawyer or may attempt or appear to provide legal advice, increasing the risk that a prospective client relationship or a lawyer–client relationship could be created. |
| **Communication Regarding Generative AI Use**<br><br>Rule 1.4; Rule 1.2 | "A lawyer should evaluate … communication obligations throughout the representation based on the facts and circumstances, including the novelty of the technology, risks associated with [G]enerative AI use, scope of the representation, and sophistication of the client."[20]<br><br>A lawyer should consider disclosing to the client the intent to use Generative AI that is not generally understood to be routinely used by lawyers as part of the representation,[21] particularly as part of an explanation of the lawyer's fees and disbursements. The disclosure will depend on circumstances including how the technology will be used, and the benefits and risks of such use. A lawyer should obtain client consent for Generative AI use if client confidences will be disclosed in connection with the use of Generative AI.<br><br>A lawyer should review any applicable client instructions or guidelines that may restrict or limit the use of Generative AI. We note that, because Generative AI currently is used routinely by lawyers, when a lawyer receives a request from a client that Generative AI not be used at all, the lawyer should consider discussing the request with the client before agreeing to it. |

2024) (criticizing an attorney-defendant and his counsel for citing "three cases that do not exist" where client provided citations hallucinated by Google Bard and counsel failed to check them).

[19] *See* Fla. Bar Bd. Rev. Comm. on Pro. Ethics, *supra* (section on Oversight of Generative AI).

[20] California Guidance at 4.

[21] Note that some Generative AI is routinely used. For example, Microsoft Word employs Generative AI in its auto-complete and grammar check functions. Westlaw, Lexis, and search engines also employ Generative AI. We do not mean to suggest that an attorney needs to disclose such uses of Generative AI. For a discussion of the importance of evaluating Generative AI tools based on intended users, see N.J. STATE BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) AND THE LAW: REPORT, REQUESTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FINDINGS 15–19 (2024) (discussing "AI Tools Intended for the Public" and "Tools Tailored for Legal Professionals"), https://njsba.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/NJSBA-TASK-FORCE-ON-AI-AND-THE-LAW-REPORT-final.pdf.

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| **Candor to the Tribunal; and Meritorious Claims and Contentions**<br><br>Rule 1.2(c); Rule 3.1; Rule 3.3; Rule 1.16 | A lawyer should recognize the risks posed by Generative AI-generated content. Generative AI tools can, and do, fabricate or "hallucinate" precedent."[22] They can also create "deepfakes"—media that appear to reflect actual events but are actually doctored or manufactured.<br><br>"A lawyer must review all [G]enerative AI outputs," including but not limited to "analysis and citations to authority," for accuracy before use for client purposes and submission to a court or other tribunal.[23] If the lawyer suspects that a client may have provided the lawyer with Generative AI-generated evidence, a lawyer may have a duty to inquire.[24] A lawyer must correct any errors or misleading statements made to adversaries, the public, or the court.[25]<br><br>"A lawyer should also check for any rules, orders, or other requirements in the relevant jurisdiction that may necessitate the disclosure of the use of [G]enerative AI."[26] |
| **Charging for Work Produced by Generative AI and Generative AI Costs**<br><br>Rule 1.5 | "A lawyer may use [G]enerative AI to more efficiently create work product and may charge for actual time spent (*e.g.*, crafting or refining [G]enerative AI inputs and prompts, or reviewing and editing [G]enerative AI outputs)."[27] A lawyer must not charge hourly fees for the time that would otherwise have been spent absent the use of Generative AI.[28] Lawyers may wish to consider |

[22] A Stanford University study found that Generative AI chatbots from OpenAI, Inc., Google LLC, and Meta Platforms Inc. hallucinate "at least 75% of the time when answering questions about a court's core ruling." Isabel Gottlieb & Isaiah Poritz, *Popular AI Chatbots Found to Give Error-Ridden Legal Answers*, Bloomberg L. (Jan. 12, 2024), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/legal-errors-by-top-ai-models-alarmingly-prevalent-study-says. Courts are already grappling with parties' citation to hallucinated precedents. *See generally Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, No. 22-CV-1461, 2023 WL 4114964 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023) (sanctioning attorneys for "submit[ing] non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations created by the artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT"); *Cohen*, 2024 WL 1193604; *see also* D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 388 (2024) (discussing the dangers of hallucinations).

[23] California Guidance at 4.

[24] *See* N.Y. City Op. 2018-4 (discussing a lawyer's duty to inquire when asked to assist in a transaction that the lawyer suspects may involve a crime or fraud); *see also* ABA Op. 491 (2020); Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 142 (2021). These same standards apply when a lawyer suspects that a client may have given the lawyer fabricated evidence.

[25] *See* Rule 3.3.

[26] California Guidance at 4.

[27] *Id.*

[28] *Id.*

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| | developing alternative fee arrangements relating to the value of their work rather than time spent.<br><br>Costs associated with Generative AI should be disclosed in advance to clients as required by Rule 1.5(b). The costs charged should be consistent with ethical guidance on disbursements and should comply with applicable law.[29] A lawyer may wish to consider appropriate use of Generative AI tools to minimize client cost as the use of Generative AI becomes more widespread. |
| **Prohibition on Discrimination**<br><br>Rule 8.4 | "Some [G]enerative AI is trained on biased [historical] information, and a lawyer should be aware of possible biases and the risks they may create when using [G]enerative AI (*e.g.*, to screen potential clients or employees)."[30] |

[29] *See* ABA Op. 93-379 (1993).

[30] California Guidance at 4.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ROBERTO MATA,

Plaintiff,

22-cv-1461 (PKC)

-against-

OPINION AND ORDER
ON SANCTIONS

AVIANCA, INC.,

Defendant.

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CASTEL, U.S.D.J.

In researching and drafting court submissions, good lawyers appropriately obtain assistance from junior lawyers, law students, contract lawyers, legal encyclopedias and databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. Technological advances are commonplace and there is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance. But existing rules impose a gatekeeping role on attorneys to ensure the accuracy of their filings. Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. Peter LoDuca, Steven A. Schwartz and the law firm of Levidow, Levidow & Oberman P.C. (the "Levidow Firm") (collectively, "Respondents") abandoned their responsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations created by the artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT, then continued to stand by the fake opinions after judicial orders called their existence into question.

Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions.[1] The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other

[1] The potential mischief is demonstrated by an innocent mistake made by counsel for Mr. Schwartz and the Levidow Firm, which counsel promptly caught and corrected on its own. In the initial version of the brief in response to the Orders to Show Cause submitted to the Court, it included three of the fake cases in its Table of Authorities. (ECF 45.)

important endeavors. The client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of a party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system. And a future litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.

The narrative leading to sanctions against Respondents includes the filing of the March 1, 2023 submission that first cited the fake cases. But if the matter had ended with Respondents coming clean about their actions shortly after they received the defendant's March 15 brief questioning the existence of the cases, or after they reviewed the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12 requiring production of the cases, the record now would look quite different. Instead, the individual Respondents doubled down and did not begin to dribble out the truth until May 25, after the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why one of the individual Respondents ought not be sanctioned.

For reasons explained and considering the conduct of each individual Respondent separately, the Court finds bad faith on the part of the individual Respondents based upon acts of conscious avoidance and false and misleading statements to the Court. (See, e.g., Findings of Fact ¶¶ 17, 20, 22-23, 40-41, 43, 46-47 and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 21, 23-24.) Sanctions will therefore be imposed on the individual Respondents. Rule 11(c)(1) also provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its . . . associate, or employee." Because the Court finds no exceptional circumstances, sanctions will be jointly imposed on the Levidow Firm. The sanctions are "limited to what

suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Rule 11(c)(4).

Set forth below are this Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the hearing of June 8, 2023.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Roberto Mata commenced this action on or about February 2, 2022, when he filed a Verified Complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, asserting that he was injured when a metal serving cart struck his left knee during a flight from El Salvador to John F. Kennedy Airport. (ECF 1.) Avianca removed the action to federal court on February 22, 2022, asserting federal question jurisdiction under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Done at Montreal, Canada, on 28 May 1999, reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. 106-45 (1999) (the "Montreal Convention"). (ECF 1.)

2. Steven A. Schwartz of the Levidow Firm had been the attorney listed on the state court complaint. But upon removal from state court to this Court, Peter LoDuca of the Levidow Firm filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Mata on March 31, 2022. (ECF 8.) Mr. Schwartz is not admitted to practice in this District. Mr. LoDuca has explained that because Mr. Schwartz is not admitted, Mr. LoDuca filed the notice of appearance while Mr. Schwartz continued to perform all substantive legal work. (LoDuca May 25 Aff't ¶¶ 3-4 (ECF 32); Schwartz May 25 Aff't ¶ 4 (ECF 32-1).)

3. On January 13, 2023, Avianca filed a motion to dismiss urging that Mata's claims are time-barred under the Montreal Convention. (ECF 16.)

4. On January 18, 2023, a letter signed by Mr. Schwartz and filed by Mr. LoDuca requested a one-month extension to respond to the motion, from February 3, 2023, to March 3, 2023. (ECF 19.) The letter stated that "the undersigned will be out of the office for a previously planned vacation" and cited a need for "extra time to properly respond to the extensive motion papers filed by the defendant." (Id.) The Court granted the request. (ECF 20.)

5. On March 1, 2023, Mr. LoDuca filed an "Affirmation in Opposition" to the motion to dismiss (the "Affirmation in Opposition").[2] (ECF 21.) The Affirmation in Opposition cited and quoted from purported judicial decisions that were said to be published in the Federal Reporter, the Federal Supplement and Westlaw. (Id.) Above Mr. LoDuca's signature line, the Affirmation in Opposition states, "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct." (Id.)

6. Although Mr. LoDuca signed the Affirmation in Opposition and filed it on ECF, he was not its author. (Tr. 8-9.) It was researched and written by Mr. Schwartz. (Tr. 8.) Mr. LoDuca reviewed the affirmation for style, stating, "I was basically looking for a flow, make sure there was nothing untoward or no large grammatical errors." (Tr. 9.) Before executing the Affirmation, Mr. LoDuca did not review any judicial authorities cited in his affirmation. (Tr. 9.) There is no claim or evidence that he made any inquiry of Mr. Schwartz as to the nature and extent of his research or whether he had found contrary precedent. Mr. LoDuca simply relied on a belief that work produced by Mr. Schwartz, a colleague of more than twenty-five years, would be reliable. (LoDuca May 25 Aff't ¶¶ 6-7.) There was no claim made by any Respondent in response to the Court's Orders to Show Cause that Mr. Schwartz had prior experience with the

[2] Plaintiff's opposition was submitted as an "affirmation" and not a memorandum of law. The Local Civil Rules of this District require that "the cases and other authorities relied upon" in opposition to a motion be set forth in a memorandum of law. Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(2), 7.1(b). An affirmation is a creature of New York state practice that is akin to a declaration under penalty of perjury. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2106 with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

Montreal Convention or bankruptcy stays. Mr. Schwartz has stated that "my practice has always been exclusively in state court . . . ." (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 6.) Respondents' memorandum of law asserts that Mr. Schwartz attempted "to research a federal bankruptcy issue with which he was completely unfamiliar." (ECF 49 at 21.)

7. Avianca filed a five-page reply memorandum on March 15, 2023. (ECF 24.) It included the following statement: "Although Plaintiff ostensibly cites to a variety of cases in opposition to this motion, the undersigned has been unable to locate most of the case law cited in Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition, and the few cases which the undersigned has been able to locate do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited." (ECF 24 at 1.) It impliedly asserted that certain cases cited in the Affirmation in Opposition were non-existent: "Plaintiff does not dispute that this action is governed by the Montreal Convention, and Plaintiff has not cited any existing authority holding that the Bankruptcy Code tolls the two-year limitations period or that New York law supplies the relevant statute of limitations." (ECF 24 at 1; emphasis added.) It then detailed by name and citation seven purported "decisions" that Avianca's counsel could not locate, and set them apart with quotation marks to distinguish a non-existent case from a real one, even if cited for a proposition for which it did not stand. (ECF 24.)

8. Despite the serious nature of Avianca's allegations, no Respondent sought to withdraw the March 1 Affirmation or provide any explanation to the Court of how it could possibly be that a case purportedly in the Federal Reporter or Federal Supplement could not be found.

9. The Court conducted its own search for the cited cases but was unable to locate multiple authorities cited in the Affirmation in Opposition.

10. Mr. LoDuca testified at the June 8 sanctions hearing that he received Avianca's reply submission and did not read it before he forwarded it to Mr. Schwartz. (Tr. 10.) Mr. Schwartz did not alert Mr. LoDuca to the contents of the reply. (Tr. 12.)

11. As it was later revealed, Mr. Schwartz had used ChatGPT, which fabricated the cited cases. Mr. Schwartz testified at the sanctions hearing that when he reviewed the reply memo, he was "operating under the false perception that this website [i.e., ChatGPT] could not possibly be fabricating cases on its own." (Tr. at 31.) He stated, "I just was not thinking that the case could be fabricated, so I was not looking at it from that point of view." (Tr. at 35.) "My reaction was, ChatGPT is finding that case somewhere. Maybe it's unpublished. Maybe it was appealed. Maybe access is difficult to get. I just never thought it could be made up." (Tr. at 33.)

12. Mr. Schwartz also testified at the hearing that he knew that there were free sites available on the internet where a known case citation to a reported decision could be entered and the decision displayed. (Tr. 23-24, 28-29.) He admitted that he entered the citation to "Varghese" but could not find it:

> THE COURT: Did you say, well they gave me part of Varghese, let me look at the full Varghese decision?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: I did.
>
> THE COURT: And what did you find when you went to look up the full Varghese decision?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: I couldn't find it.
>
> THE COURT: And yet you cited it in the brief to me.
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: I did, again, operating under the false assumption and disbelief that this website could produce completely fabricated cases. And if I knew that, I obviously never would have submitted these cases.

(Tr. 28.)[3]

13. On April 11, 2023, the Court issued an Order directing Mr. LoDuca to file an affidavit by April 18, 2023[4] that annexed copies of the following decisions cited in the Affirmation in Opposition: Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd., 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2019); Shaboon v. Egyptair, 2013 IL App (1st) 111279-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Peterson v. Iran Air, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012); Martinez v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 2019 WL 4639462 (Tex. App. Sept. 25, 2019); Estate of Durden v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 2017 WL 2418825 (Ga. Ct. App. June 5, 2017); Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 2003); Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 F.3d 366, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1999); and In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, LA, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir. 1987). (ECF 25.) The Order stated: "Failure to comply will result in dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P." (ECF 25.)

14. On April 12, 2023, the Court issued an Order that directed Mr. LoDuca to annex an additional decision, which was cited in the Affirmation in Opposition as Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008). (ECF 27.)

15. Mr. Schwartz understood the import of the Orders of April 11 and 12 requiring the production of the actual cases: "I thought the Court searched for the cases [and] could not find them . . . ." (Tr. 36.)

16. Mr. LoDuca requested an extension of time to respond to April 25, 2023. (ECF 26.) The letter stated: "This extension is being requested as the undersigned is currently

[3] Mr. Schwartz's testimony appears to acknowledge that he knew that "Varghese" could not be found before the March 1 Affirmation was filed citing the fake case. His answer also could refer to the April 25 Affidavit submitting the actual cases. Either way, he knew before making a submission to the Court that the full text of "Varghese" could not be found but kept silent.

[4] The Court's Order directed the filing to be made by April 18, 2022, not 2023.

out of the office on vacation and will be returning April 18, 2023." (Id.) Mr. LoDuca signed the letter and filed it on ECF. (Id.)

17. Mr. LoDuca's statement was false and he knew it to be false at the time he made the statement. Under questioning by the Court at the sanctions hearing, Mr. LoDuca admitted that he was not out of the office on vacation. (Tr. 13-14, 19.) Mr. LoDuca testified that "[m]y intent of the letter was because Mr. Schwartz was away, but I was aware of what was in the letter when I signed it. . . . I just attempted to get Mr. Schwartz the additional time he needed because he was out of the office at the time." (Tr. 44.) The Court finds that Mr. LoDuca made a knowingly false statement to the Court that he was "out of the office on vacation" in a successful effort to induce the Court to grant him an extension of time. (ECF 28.) The lie had the intended effect of concealing Mr. Schwartz's role in preparing the March 1 Affirmation and the April 25 Affidavit and concealing Mr. LoDuca's lack of meaningful role in confirming the truth of the statements in his affidavit. This is evidence of the subjective bad faith of Mr. LoDuca.

18. Mr. LoDuca executed and filed an affidavit on April 25, 2023 (the "April 25 Affidavit") that annexed what were purported to be copies or excerpts of all but one of the decisions required by the Orders of April 11 and 12. Mr. LoDuca stated "[t]hat I was unable to locate the case of Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2008) which was cited by the Court in Varghese." (ECF 29.)

19. The April 25 Affidavit stated that the purported decisions it annexed "may not be inclusive of the entire opinions but only what is made available by online database." (Id. ¶ 4.) It did not identify any "online database" by name. It also stated "[t]hat the opinion in

Shaboon v. Egyptair 2013 IL App (1st) 111279-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) is an unpublished opinion." (Id. ¶ 5.)

20. In fact, Mr. LoDuca did not author the April 25 Affidavit, had no role in its preparation and no knowledge of whether the statements therein were true. Mr. Schwartz was the attorney who drafted the April 25 Affidavit and compiled its exhibits. (Tr. 38.)

21. At the sanctions hearing, Mr. Schwartz testified that he prepared Mr. LoDuca's affidavit, walked it into "his office" twenty feet away, and "[h]e looked it over, and he signed it." (Tr. 41.)[5] There is no evidence that Mr. LoDuca asked a single question. Mr. LoDuca had not been provided with a draft of the affidavit before he signed it. Mr. LoDuca knew that Mr. Schwartz did not practice in federal court and, in response to the Order to Show Cause, he has never contended that Mr. Schwartz had experience with the Montreal Convention or bankruptcy stays. Indeed, at the sanctions hearing, Mr. Schwartz testified that he thought a citation in the form "F.3d" meant "federal district, third department." (Tr. 33.)[6]

22. Facially, the April 25 Affidavit did not comply with the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12 because it did not attach the full text of any of the "cases" that are now admitted to be fake. It attached only excerpts of the "cases." And the April 25 Affidavit recited that one "case," "Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2008)", notably with a citation to the Federal Reporter, could not be found. (ECF 29.) No explanation was offered.

23. Regarding the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12 requiring an affidavit from Mr. LoDuca, Mr. LoDuca testified, "Me, I didn't do anything other than turn over to Mr.

[5] The declaration of Mr. Schwartz claimed that the April 25 Affidavit was executed in his own office, not Mr. LoDuca's office. (Schwartz June 6 Dec. ¶ 27 ("Mr. LoDuca then came into my office and signed the affidavit in front of me . . . .").)

[6] The Court finds this claim from a lawyer who has practiced in the litigation arena for approximately 30 years to be not credible and was contradicted by his later testimony. (See Tr. 34 ("THE COURT: And F.3d is the third edition of the Federal Reporter, correct? MR. SCHWARTZ: Right.").)

Schwartz to locate the cases that [the Court] had requested." (Tr. 13.) He testified that he read the April 25 Affidavit and "saw the cases that were attached to it. Mr. Schwartz had assured me that this was what he could find with respect to the cases. And I submitted it to the Court." (Tr. 14.) Mr. LoDuca had observed that the "cases" annexed to his April 25 Affidavit were not being submitted in their entirety, and explained that "I understood that was the best that Mr. Schwartz could find at the time based on the search that he or – the database that he had available to him." (Tr. 15.) Mr. LoDuca testified that it "never crossed my mind" that the cases were bogus. (Tr. 16.)

24. The Court reviewed the purported decisions annexed to the April 25 Affidavit, which have some traits that are superficially consistent with actual judicial decisions. The Court need not describe every deficiency contained in the fake decisions annexed to the April 25 Affidavit. It makes the following exemplar findings as to the three "decisions" that were purported to be issued by federal courts.

25. The "Varghese" decision is presented as being issued by a panel of judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that consisted of Judges Adalberto Jordan, Robin S. Rosenbaum and Patrick Higginbotham,[7] with the decision authored by Judge Jordan. (ECF 29-1.) It bears the docket number 18-13694. (Id.) "Varghese" discusses the Montreal Convention's limitations period and the purported tolling effects of the automatic federal bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). (ECF 29-1.)

26. The Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that the decision is not an authentic ruling of the Court and that no party by the name of "Vargese" or "Varghese" has been party to a proceeding in the Court since the

[7] Judge Higginbotham is a Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, not the Eleventh Circuit. Judges Jordan and Rosenbaum sit on the Eleventh Circuit.

institution of its electronic case filing system in 2010. A copy of the fake "Varghese" opinion is attached as Appendix A.

27. The "Varghese" decision shows stylistic and reasoning flaws that do not generally appear in decisions issued by United States Courts of Appeals. Its legal analysis is gibberish. It references a claim for the wrongful death of George Scaria Varghese brought by Susan Varghese. (Id.) It then describes the claims of a plaintiff named Anish Varghese who, due to airline overbooking, was denied boarding on a flight from Bangkok to New York that had a layover in Guangzhou, China. (Id.) The summary of the case's procedural history is difficult to follow and borders on nonsensical, including an abrupt mention of arbitration and a reference to plaintiff's decision to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy as a tactical response to the district court's dismissal of his complaint. (Id.) Without explanation, "Varghese" later references the plaintiff's Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. (Id.) The "Varghese" defendant is also said to have filed for bankruptcy protection in China, also triggering a stay of proceedings. (Id.) Quotation marks are often unpaired. The "Varghese" decision abruptly ends without a conclusion.

28. The "Varghese" decision bears the docket number 18-13694, which is associated with the case George Cornea v. U.S. Attorney General, et al. The Federal Reporter citation for "Varghese" is associated with J.D. v Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

29. The "Varghese" decision includes internal citations and quotes from decisions that are themselves non-existent:

a. It cites to "Holliday v. Atl. Capital Corp., 738 F.2d 1153 (11th Cir. 1984)", which does not exist. The case appearing at that citation is Gibbs v. Maxwell House, 738 F.2d 1153 (11th Cir. 1984).

b. It cites to "Gen. Wire Spring Co. v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 556 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1977)", which does not exist. The case appearing at that citation is United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977).

c. It cites to "Hyatt v. N. Cent. Airlines, 92 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1996)", which does not exist. There are two brief orders appearing at 92 F.3d 1074 issued by the Eleventh Circuit in other cases.

d. It cites to "Zaunbrecher v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 772 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014)", which does not exist. The case appearing at that citation is Witt v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 772 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2014).

e. It cites to "Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 F.3d 1237, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008)", which does not exist as cited. A Supreme Court decision with the same name, Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996), held that the Warsaw Convention does not permit a plaintiff to recover damages for loss of society resulting from the death of a relative, and did not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay. The Federal Reporter citation for "Zicherman" is for Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008).

f. It cites to "In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 B.R. 466, 471 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005)", which does not exist as cited. A Second Circuit decision with the same name, In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003), did not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay. The case appearing at the Bankruptcy Reporter

citation is In re 652 West 160th LLC, 330 B.R. 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

g. Other "decisions" cited in "Varghese" have correct names and citations but do not contain the language quoted or support the propositions for which they are offered. In re Rimstat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2000), is a decision relating to Rule 11 sanctions for attorney misconduct and does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay. In re PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2003), does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay, and is incorrectly identified as an opinion of the Second Circuit. Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990), does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay, and addresses whether a trustee in bankruptcy may recover certain payments made by the debtor to the Internal Revenue Service. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam), does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay, and held that a federal proceeding should have been stayed pending the outcome of New Mexico state court proceedings relating to the interpretation of the state constitution. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999), does not contain the quoted language discussing the purpose of the Montreal Convention. In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002), affirmed a bankruptcy court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration.

30. The April 25 Affidavit annexes a decision identified as "Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 1999)." (ECF 29-7.) As submitted, the "Miller" decision seems to be an excerpt from a longer decision and consists only of two introductory paragraphs.

(Id.) It bears the docket number 98-7926, and purports to be written by Judge Barrington D. Parker of the Second Circuit, with Judges Joseph McLaughlin and Dennis Jacobs also on the panel. (Id.) It abruptly ends with the phrase "Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898". (Id.)

31. "Miller" purports to apply the Warsaw Convention to a claim arising out of the real and tragic 1991 crash of United Airlines Flight 585, which was a domestic flight from Denver to Colorado Springs.[8] "Miller" references a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by United Airlines on December 4, 1992. (Id.) There is no public record of any United Airlines bankruptcy proceeding in or around that time.[9] (Id.) "Miller" identifies Alberto R. Gonzales, purportedly from the law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, as one of the attorneys for the defendant. (Id.) Alberto R. Gonzales is the name of the former United States Attorney General, who served from 2005 to 2007.[10]

32. The "Miller" decision does not exist. Second Circuit docket number 98-7926 is associated with the case Vitale v. First Fidelity, which was assigned to a panel consisting of Judges Richard Cardamone, Amalya Kearse and Chester Straub. The Federal Reporter citation for "Miller" is to Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 1999).

33. The April 25 Affidavit also annexes a decision identified as "Petersen v. Iran Air, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012)", which bears an additional citation to 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409. (ECF 29-3.) It is identified as a decision by Judge Reggie B. Walton and has the docket number 10-0542. (Id.) "Petersen" appears to confuse the District of Columbia

[8] See National Transportation Safety Board, "Aircraft Accident Report: Uncontrolled Descent and Collision With Terrain, United Airlines Flight 585," https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0101.pdf (last accessed June 21, 2023).

[9] It appears that United Airlines filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2002. See Edward Wong, "Airline Shock Waves: The Overview; Bankruptcy Case Is Filed by United," N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2002, Sec. A p. 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/business/airline-shock-waves-the-overview-bankruptcy-case-is-filed-by-united.html (last accessed June 21, 2023).

[10] See, e.g., https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/gonzales-bio html (last accessed June 21, 2023).

with the state of Washington. (Id. ("Therefore, Petersen's argument that the state courts of Washington have concurrent jurisdiction is unavailing.").) As support for its legal conclusion, "Petersen" cites itself as precedent: "'Therefore, the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with any other court that may have jurisdiction under applicable law, including any foreign court.' (Petersen v. Iran Air, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126 (D.D.C. 2012))". (ECF 29-3.)

34. The "Petersen" decision does not exist. Docket number 10-cv-542 (D.D.C.) is associated with the case Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Kappos, which was before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. The Federal Supplement citation is to United States v. ISS Marine Services, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012), a decision by Judge Beryl A. Howell. The Lexis citation is to United States v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012), in which Judge Janet T. Neff adopted the Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge.

35. The "Shaboon", "Martinez" and "Durden" decisions contain similar deficiencies.

36. Respondents have now acknowledged that the "Varghese", "Miller", "Petersen", "Shaboon", "Martinez" and "Durden" decisions were generated by ChatGPT and do not exist. (See, e.g., ECF 32, 32-1.)

37. Mr. Schwartz has endeavored to explain why he turned to ChatGPT for legal research. The Levidow Firm primarily practices in New York state courts. (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 10; Tr. 45.) It uses a legal research service called Fastcase and does not maintain Westlaw or LexisNexis accounts. (Tr. 22-23.) When Mr. Schwartz began to research the Montreal Convention, the firm's Fastcase account had limited access to federal cases. (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 12; Tr. 24.) "And it had occurred to me that I heard about this new site which I assumed -- I falsely assumed was like a super search engine called ChatGPT, and that's what I

used." (Tr. 24; see also Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 15.) Mr. Schwartz had not previously used ChatGPT and became aware of it through press reports and conversations with family members. (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 14.)

38. Mr. Schwartz testified that he began by querying ChatGPT for broad legal guidance and then narrowed his questions to cases that supported the argument that the federal bankruptcy stay tolled the limitations period for a claim under the Montreal Convention. (Tr. 25-27.) ChatGPT generated summaries or excerpts but not full "opinions." (Tr. 27 & ECF 46-1; Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 19.)

39. The June 6 Schwartz Declaration annexes the history of Mr. Schwartz's prompts to ChatGPT and the chatbot's responses. (ECF 46-1.) His first prompt stated, "argue that the statute of limitations is tolled by bankruptcy of defendant pursuant to montreal convention". (Id. at 2.) ChatGPT responded with broad descriptions of the Montreal Convention, statutes of limitations and the federal bankruptcy stay, advised that "[t]he answer to this question depends on the laws of the country in which the lawsuit is filed"[11] and then stated that the statute of limitations under the Montreal Convention is tolled by a bankruptcy filing. (Id. at 2-3.) ChatGPT did not cite case law to support these statements. Mr. Schwartz then entered various prompts that caused ChatGPT to generate descriptions of fake cases, including "provide case law in support that statute of limitations is tolled by bankruptcy of defendant under montreal convention", "show me specific holdings in federal cases where the statute of limitations was tolled due to bankruptcy of the airline", "show me more cases" and "give me some cases where te [sic] montreal convention allowed tolling of the statute of limitations due to bankruptcy". (Id.

[11] In fact, courts have generally held that the Montreal Convention seeks to create uniformity in the limitations periods enforced across its signatory countries. See, e.g., Ireland v. AMR Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).

at 2, 10, 11.) When directed to "provide case law", "show me specific holdings", "show me more cases" and "give me some cases", the chatbot complied by making them up.

40. At the time that he prepared the Affirmation in Opposition, Mr. Schwartz did not have the full text of any "decision" generated by ChatGPT. (Tr. 27.) He cited and quoted only from excerpts generated by the chatbot. (Tr. 27.)

41. In his affidavit filed on May 25, Mr. Schwartz stated that he relied on ChatGPT "to supplement the legal research performed." (ECF 32-1 ¶ 6; emphasis added).) He also stated that he "greatly regrets having utilized generative artificial intelligence to supplement the legal research performed herein . . . ." (Id. ¶ 13; emphasis added.) But at the hearing, Mr. Schwartz acknowledged that ChatGPT was not used to "supplement" his research:

> THE COURT: Let me ask you, did you do any other research in opposition to the motion to dismiss other than through ChatGPT?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: Other than initially going to Fastcase and failing there, no.
>
> THE COURT: You found nothing on Fastcase.
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: Fastcase was insufficient as to being able to access, so, no, I did not.
>
> THE COURT: You did not find anything on Fastcase?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: No.
>
> THE COURT: In your declaration in response to the order to show cause, didn't you tell me that you used ChatGPT to supplement your research?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.
>
> THE COURT: Well, what research was it supplementing?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I had gone to Fastcase, and I was able to authenticate two of the cases through Fastcase that ChatGPT had given me. That was it.

> THE COURT: But ChatGPT was not supplementing your research. It was your research, correct?
>
> MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct. It became my last resort. So I guess that's correct.

(Tr. 37-38.) Mr. Schwartz's statement in his May 25 affidavit that ChatGPT "supplemented" his research was a misleading attempt to mitigate his actions by creating the false impression that he had done other, meaningful research on the issue and did not rely exclusive on an AI chatbot, when, in truth and in fact, it was the only source of his substantive arguments.[12] These misleading statements support the Court's finding of subjective bad faith.

42. Following receipt of the April 25 Affirmation, the Court issued an Order dated May 4, 2023 directing Mr. LoDuca to show cause why he ought not be sanctioned pursuant to: (1) Rule 11(b)(2) & (c), Fed. R. Civ. P., (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and (3) the inherent power of the Court, for (A) citing non-existent cases to the Court in his Affirmation in Opposition, and (B) submitting to the Court annexed to April 25 Affidavit copies of non-existent judicial opinions. (ECF 31.) It directed Mr. LoDuca to file a written response and scheduled a show-cause hearing for 12 p.m. on June 8, 2023. (Id.) Mr. LoDuca submitted an affidavit in response, which also annexed an affidavit from Mr. Schwartz. (ECF 32, 32-1.)

43. Mr. Schwartz made the highly dubious claim that, before he saw the first Order to Show Cause of May 4, he "still could not fathom that ChatGPT could produce multiple fictitious cases . . . ." (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 30.) He states that when he read the Order of May 4, "I realized that I must have made a serious error and that there must be a major flaw with

[12] Cf. Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, 79 (Puffin Books ed. 2015) (1865):
"Take some more tea," the March Hare said to Alice, very earnestly.
"I've had nothing yet," Alice replied in an offended tone, "so I can't take more."
"You mean you can't take *less*," said the Hatter: "it's very easy to take *more* than nothing."

the search aspects of the ChatGPT program." (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 29.) The Court rejects Mr. Schwartz's claim because (a) he acknowledges reading Avianca's brief claiming that the cases did not exist and could not be found (Tr. 31-33); (b) concluded that the Court could not locate the cases when he read the April 11 and 12 Orders (Tr. 36-37); (c) had looked for "Varghese" and could not find it (Tr. 28); and (d) had been "unable to locate" "Zicherman" after the Court ordered its submission (Apr. 25 Aff't ¶ 3).

44. The Schwartz Affidavit of May 25 contained the first acknowledgement from any Respondent that the Affirmation in Opposition cited to and quoted from bogus cases generated by ChatGPT. (ECF 32-1.)

45. The Schwartz Affidavit of May 25 included screenshots taken from a smartphone in which Mr. Schwartz questioned ChatGPT about the reliability of its work (e.g., "Is Varghese a real case" and "Are the other cases you provided fake"). (ECF 32-1.) ChatGPT responded that it had supplied "real" authorities that could be found through Westlaw, LexisNexis and the Federal Reporter. (Id.) The screenshots are annexed as Appendix B to this Opinion and Order.

46. When those screenshots were submitted as exhibits to Mr. Schwartz's affidavit of May 25, he stated: "[T]he citations and opinions in question were provided by Chat GPT which also provided its legal source and assured the reliability of its content. Excerpts from the queries presented and responses provided are attached hereto." (Schwartz May 25 Aff't ¶ 8.) This is an assertion by Mr. Schwartz that he was misled by ChatGPT into believing that it had provided him with actual judicial decisions. While no date is given for the queries, the declaration strongly suggested that he questioned whether "Varghese" was "real" prior to either the March 1 Affirmation in Opposition or the April 25 Affidavit.

47. But Mr. Schwartz's declaration of June 6 offers a different explanation and interpretation, and asserts that those same ChatGPT answers confirmed his by-then-growing suspicions that the chatbot had been responding "without regard for the truth of the answers it was providing":

> Before the First OSC, however, I still could not fathom that ChatGPT could produce multiple fictitious cases, all of which had various indicia of reliability such as case captions, the names of the judges from the correct locations, and detailed fact patterns and legal analysis that sounded authentic. The First OSC caused me to have doubts. As a result, I asked ChatGPT directly whether one of the cases it cited, "*Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd*., 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2009)," was a real case. Based on what I was beginning to realize about ChatGPT, I highly suspected that it was not. However, ChatGPT again responded that Varghese "does indeed exist" and even told me that it was available on Westlaw and LexisNexis, contrary to what the Court and defendant's counsel were saying. <u>This confirmed my suspicion that ChatGPT was not providing accurate information and was instead simply responding to language prompts without regard for the truth of the answers it was providing.</u> However, by this time the cases had already been cited in our opposition papers and provided to the Court.

(Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 30; emphasis added.) These shifting and contradictory explanations, submitted even after the Court raised the possibility of Rule 11 sanctions, undermine the credibility of Mr. Schwartz and support a finding of subjective bad faith.

48. On May 26, 2023, the Court issued a supplemental Order directing Mr. Schwartz to show cause at the June 8 hearing why he ought not be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) and (c), 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's inherent powers for aiding and causing the citation of non-existent cases in the Affirmation in Opposition, the submission of non-existent judicial opinions annexed to the April 25 Affidavit and the use of a false and fraudulent notarization in the April 25 Affidavit. (ECF 31.) The same Order directed the Levidow Firm to also show cause why it ought not be sanctioned and directed Mr. LoDuca to show cause why he

ought not be sanctioned for the use of a false or fraudulent notarization in the April 25 Affidavit. (Id.) The Order also directed the Respondents to file written responses. (Id.)

49. Counsel thereafter filed notices of appearance on behalf of Mr. Schwartz and the Levidow Firm, and, separately, on behalf of Mr. LoDuca. (ECF 34-36, 39-40.) Messrs. LoDuca and Schwartz filed supplemental declarations on June 6. (ECF 44-1, 46.) Thomas R. Corvino, who describes himself as the sole equity partner of the Levidow Firm, also filed a declaration. (ECF 47.)

50. On June 8, 2023, the Court held a sanctions hearing on the Order to Show Cause and the supplemental Order to Show Cause. After being placed under oath, Messrs. LoDuca and Schwartz responded to questioning from the Court and delivered prepared statements in which they expressed their remorse. Mr. Corvino, a member of the Levidow Firm, also delivered a statement.

51. At no time has any Respondent written to this Court seeking to withdraw the March 1 Affirmation in Opposition or advise the Court that it may no longer rely upon it.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Rule 11(b)(2) states: "By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law . . . ."

2. "Under Rule 11, a court may sanction an attorney for, among other things, misrepresenting facts or making frivolous legal arguments." Muhammad v. Walmart Stores East, L.P., 732 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

3. A legal argument may be sanctioned as frivolous when it amounts to an "'abuse of the adversary system . . . .'" Salovaara v. Eckert, 222 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990)). "Merely incorrect legal statements are not sanctionable under Rule 11(b)(2)." Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2003). "The fact that a legal theory is a long-shot does not necessarily mean it is sanctionable." Fishoff v. Coty Inc., 634 F.3d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 2011). A legal contention is frivolous because it has "no chance of success" and there "is no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

4. An attorney violates Rule 11(b)(2) if existing caselaw unambiguously forecloses a legal argument. See Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming Rule 11(b)(2) sanction for frivolous claims where plaintiff's trademark claims "clearly lacked foundation") (per curiam); Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 176 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming Rule 11(b)(2) sanction where no authority supported plaintiff's theory of liability under SEC Rule 10b-13).

5. The filing of papers "without taking the necessary care in their preparation" is an "abuse of the judicial system" that is subject to Rule 11 sanction. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990). Rule 11 creates an "incentive to stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers." Id. (quotation marks omitted). "Rule 11 'explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct

a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.'" AJ Energy LLC v. Woori Bank, 829 Fed. App'x 533, 535 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (quoting Gutierrez v. Fox, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998)).

6. Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.0, states: "A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer . . . ." A lawyer may make a false statement of law where he "liberally us[ed] ellipses" in order to "change" or "misrepresent" a court's holding. United States v. Fernandez, 516 Fed. App'x 34, 36 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2013) (admonishing but not sanctioning attorney for his "editorial license" and noting his affirmative obligation to correct false statements of law) (summary order); see also United States v. Salameh, 1993 WL 168568, at *2-3 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1993) (admonishing but not sanctioning attorney for failing to disclose that the sole decision cited in support of a legal argument was vacated on appeal) (Duffy, J.).

7. It is a crime to knowingly forge the signature of a United States judge or the seal of a federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 505.[13] Writing for the panel, then-Judge Sotomayor explained that "[section] 505 is concerned . . . with protecting the integrity of a government function – namely, federal judicial proceedings." United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2007). "When an individual forges a judge's signature in order to pass off a false document

[13] The statute states: "Whoever forges the signature of any judge, register, or other officer of any court of the United States, or of any Territory thereof, or forges or counterfeits the seal of any such court, or knowingly concurs in using any such forged or counterfeit signature or seal, for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or document, or tenders in evidence any such proceeding or document with a false or counterfeit signature of any such judge, register, or other officer, or a false or counterfeit seal of the court, subscribed or attached thereto, knowing such signature or seal to be false or counterfeit, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 505.

as an authentic one issued by the courts of the United States, such conduct implicates the interests protected by § 505 whether or not the actor intends to deprive another of money or property." Id. Reich affirmed the jury's guilty verdict against an attorney-defendant who drafted and circulated a forged Order that was purported to be signed by a magistrate judge, which prompted his adversary to withdraw an application pending before the Second Circuit. Id. at 182-83, 189-90; see also United States v. Davalos, 2008 WL 4642109 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2008) (sentencing defendant to 15 months' imprisonment for the use of counterfeit Orders containing forged signatures of Second Circuit judges) (Sweet, J.).

8. The fake opinions cited and submitted by Respondents do not include any signature or seal, and the Court therefore concludes that Respondents did not violate section 505. The Court notes, however, that the citation and submission of fake opinions raises similar concerns to those described in Reich.

9. The Court has described Respondents' submission of fake cases as an unprecedented circumstance. (ECF 31 at 1.) A fake opinion is not "existing law" and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law.[14] An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system. Salovaara, 222 F.3d at 34.

10. An attorney's compliance with Rule 11(b)(2) is not assessed solely at the moment that the paper is submitted. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 added language that certifies an attorney's Rule 11 obligation continues when "later advocating" a legal contention

[14] To the extent that the Affirmation in Opposition cited existing authorities, those decisions did not support the propositions for which they were offered, with the exception of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and, in part, Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2005).

first made in a written filing covered by the Rule. Thus, "a litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit." Rule 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. The failure to correct a prior statement in a pending motion is the later advocacy of that statement and is subject to sanctions. Galin v. Hamada, 283 F. Supp. 3d 189, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ("[A] court may impose sanctions on a party for refusing to withdraw an allegation or claim even after it is shown to be inaccurate.") (Furman, J.) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted); Bressler v. Liebman, 1997 WL 466553, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1997) (an attorney was potentially liable under Rule 11 when he "continued to press the claims . . . in conferences after information provided by opposing counsel and analysis by the court indicated the questionable merit of those claims.") (Preska, J.).

11. Rule 11(c)(3) states: "On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b)." "If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee." Rule 11(c)(1).

12. Any Rule 11 sanction should be "made with restraint" because in exercising sanctions powers, a trial court may be acting "as accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge." Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 387 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Sanctions should not be imposed "for minor, inconsequential violations of the

standards prescribed by subdivision (b)." Rule 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.

13. Mr. Schwartz is not admitted to practice in this District and did not file a notice of appearance. However, Rule 11(c)(1) permits a court to "impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney . . . that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation." The Court has authority to impose an appropriate sanction on Mr. Schwartz for a Rule 11 violation.

14. When, as here, a court considers whether to impose sanctions sua sponte, it "is akin to the court's inherent power of contempt," and, "like contempt, sua sponte sanctions in those circumstances should issue only upon a finding of subjective bad faith." Muhammad, 732 F.3d at 108. By contrast, where an adversary initiates sanctions proceedings under Rule 11(c)(2), the attorney may take advantage of that Rule's 21-day safe harbor provision and withdraw or correct the challenged filing, in which case sanctions may issue if the attorney's statement was objectively unreasonable. Muhammad, 732 F.3d at 108; In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). Subjective bad faith is "a heightened mens rea standard" that is intended to permit zealous advocacy while deterring improper submissions. Id. at 91.

15. A finding of bad faith is also required for a court to sanction an attorney pursuant to its inherent power. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991). "Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (internal citation omitted).

16. "[B]ad faith may be inferred where the action is completely without merit." In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Any notice or warning provided to the attorney is relevant to a finding of bad faith. See id. ("Here, not only were the claims meritless, but [appellant] was warned of their frivolity by the Bankruptcy Court before he filed the appeal to the District Court.").

17. The Second Circuit has most often discussed subjective bad faith in the context of false factual statements and not unwarranted or frivolous legal arguments. Subjective bad faith includes the knowing and intentional submission of a false statement of fact. See, e.g., Rankin v. City of Niagara Falls, Dep't of Public Works, 569 Fed. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions on attorney who obtained extensions by falsely claiming that the submission of a "substantive" summary judgment filing had been delayed by heavy workload) (summary order). An attorney acts in subjective bad faith by offering "essential" facts that explicitly or impliedly "run contrary to statements" that the attorney made on behalf of the same client in other proceedings. Revellino & Byzcek, LLP v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., 682 Fed. App'x 73, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions where allegations in a federal civil rights complaint misleadingly omitted key facts asserted by the same attorney on behalf of the same client in a related state criminal proceeding) (summary order).

18. An assertion may be made in subjective bad faith even when it was based in confusion. United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 Fed. App'x 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2017) ("[C]onfusion about corporate complexities would not justify falsely purporting to have personal knowledge as to more than sixty defendants' involvement in wrongdoing.") (summary order). A false statement of knowledge can constitute subjective bad faith where the speaker "'knew that he had no such knowledge . . . .'" Id. at 27 (quoting United States ex rel. Hayes v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 2014 WL 10748104, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014), R & R adopted, 2016 WL 463732 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016)).

19. "Evidence that would satisfy the knowledge standard in a criminal case ought to be sufficient in a sanctions motion and, thus, knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence and conscious avoidance may be the equivalent of knowledge." Cardona v. Mohabir, 2014 WL 1804793, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2014) (citing United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477-79 (2d Cir. 2003)); accord Estevez v. Berkeley College, 2022 WL 17177971, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2022) ("[R]equisite actual knowledge may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence and inferred from conscious avoidance.") (Seibel, J.) (quotation marks omitted). The conscious avoidance test is met when a person "consciously avoided learning [a] fact while aware of a high probability of its existence, unless the factfinder is persuaded that the [person] actually believed the contrary." United States v. Finkelstein, 229 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). "The rationale for imputing knowledge in such circumstances is that one who deliberately avoided knowing the wrongful nature of his conduct is as culpable as one who knew." Id. It requires more than being "merely negligent, foolish or mistaken," and the person must be "aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact." Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 481-82 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

20. Respondents point to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Freeman, as adopted by Judge McMahon, in Braun ex rel. Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. v. Zhiguo Fu, 2015 WL 4389893, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2015), which declined to sanction a law firm associate who drafted and signed a complaint that falsely alleged that the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative suit was a shareholder of the nominal defendant. That attorney acted in

reliance on the plaintiff's signed verification of the complaint, partner communications with the plaintiff, and contents of law firm files that appeared to contain false information. Id. at *5-6, 19. Braun concluded that this attorney did not act with subjective bad faith by innocently relying on the mistruths of others. Id. at *19. There is no suggestion in Braun that this attorney had a reason to know or suspect that he was relying on falsehoods or misinformation.

21. Here, Respondents advocated for the fake cases and legal arguments contained in the Affirmation in Opposition after being informed by their adversary's submission that their citations were non-existent and could not be found. (Findings of Fact ¶¶ 7, 11.) Mr. Schwartz understood that the Court had not been able to locate the fake cases. (Findings of Fact ¶ 15.) Mr. LoDuca, the only attorney of record, consciously avoided learning the facts by neither reading the Avianca submission when received nor after receiving the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12. Respondents' circumstances are not similar to those of the attorney in Braun.

22. "In considering Rule 11 sanctions, the knowledge and conduct of each respondent lawyer must be separately assessed and principles of imputation of knowledge do not apply." Weddington v. Sentry Indus., Inc., 2020 WL 264431, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2020).

23. The Court concludes that Mr. LoDuca acted with subjective bad faith in violating Rule 11 in the following respects:

a. Mr. LoDuca violated Rule 11 in not reading a single case cited in his March 1 Affirmation in Opposition and taking no other steps on his own to check whether any aspect of the assertions of law were warranted by existing law. An inadequate or inattentive "inquiry" may be unreasonable under the circumstances. But signing and filing that affirmation after making no "inquiry" was an act of subjective bad faith. This is especially so because he knew of Mr. Schwartz's lack of familiarity with federal law, the Montreal Convention and

bankruptcy stays, and the limitations of research tools made available by the law firm with which he and Mr. Schwartz were associated.

b. Mr. LoDuca violated Rule 11 in swearing to the truth of the April 25 Affidavit with no basis for doing so. While an inadequate inquiry may not suggest bad faith, the absence of any inquiry supports a finding of bad faith. Mr. Schwartz walked into his office, presented him with an affidavit that he had never seen in draft form, and Mr. LoDuca read it and signed it under oath. A cursory review of his own affidavit would have revealed that (1) "Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2008)" could not be found, (2) many of the cases were excerpts and not full cases and (3) reading only the opening passages of, for example, "Varghese", would have revealed that it was internally inconsistent and nonsensical.

c. Further, the Court directed Mr. LoDuca to submit the April 25 Affidavit and Mr. LoDuca lied to the Court when seeking an extension, claiming that he, Mr. LoDuca, was going on vacation when, in truth and in fact, Mr. Schwartz, the true author of the April 25 Affidavit, was the one going on vacation. This is evidence of Mr. LoDuca's bad faith.

24. The Court concludes that Mr. Schwartz acted with subjective bad faith in violating Rule 11 in the following respects:

a. Mr. Schwartz violated Rule 11 in connection with the April 25 Affidavit because, as he testified at the hearing, when he looked for "Varghese" he "couldn't find it," yet did not reveal this in the April 25 Affidavit. He also offered no explanation for his inability to find "Zicherman". Poor and sloppy research would merely have been objectively unreasonable. But Mr. Schwartz was aware of facts that alerted him to the high probability that "Varghese" and "Zicherman" did not exist and consciously avoided confirming that fact.

b. Mr. Schwartz's subjective bad faith is further supported by the untruthful assertion that ChatGPT was merely a "supplement" to his research, his conflicting accounts about his queries to ChatGPT as to whether "Varghese" is a "real" case, and the failure to disclose reliance on ChatGPT in the April 25 Affidavit.

25. The Levidow Firm is jointly and severally liable for the Rule 11(b)(2) violations of Mr. LoDuca and Mr. Schwartz. Rule 11(c)(1) provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee." The Levidow Firm has not pointed to exceptional circumstances that warrant a departure from Rule 11(c)(1). Mr. Corvino has acknowledged responsibility, identified remedial measures taken by the Levidow Firm, including an expanded Fastcase subscription and CLE programming, and expressed his regret for Respondents' submissions. (Corvino Decl. ¶¶ 10-15; Tr. 44-47.)

26. The Court declines to separately impose any sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides for a sanction against any attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously . . . ." "By its terms, § 1927 looks to unreasonable and vexatious multiplications of proceedings; and it imposes an obligation on attorneys throughout the entire litigation to avoid dilatory tactics. The purpose of this statute is to deter unnecessary delays in litigation." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d at 1345 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Respondents' reliance on fakes cases has caused several harms but dilatory tactics and delay were not among them.

27. Each of the Respondents is sanctioned under Rule 11 and, alternatively, under the inherent power of this Court.

28. A Rule 11 sanction should advance both specific and general deterrence. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404. "A sanction imposed under [Rule 11] must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation." Rule 11(c)(4). "The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc." Rule 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.

29. "'[B]ecause the purpose of imposing Rule 11 sanctions is deterrence, a court should impose the least severe sanctions necessary to achieve the goal.'" (RC) 2 Pharma Connect, LLC v. Mission Pharmacal Co., 2023 WL 112552, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2023) (Liman, J.) (quoting Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 2005 WL 912017, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005)). "[T]he Court has 'wide discretion' to craft an appropriate sanction, and may consider the effects on the parties and the full knowledge of the relevant facts gained during the sanctions hearing." Heaston v. City of New York, 2022 WL 182069, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2022) (Chen, J.) (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986)).

30. The Court has considered the specific circumstances of this case. The Levidow Firm has arranged for outside counsel to conduct a mandatory Continuing Legal Education program on technological competence and artificial intelligence programs. (Corvino

Decl. ¶ 14.) The Levidow Firm also intends to hold mandatory training for all lawyers and staff on notarization practices. (Corvino Decl. ¶ 15.) Imposing a sanction of further and additional mandatory education would be redundant.

31. Counsel for Avianca has not sought the reimbursement of attorneys' fees or expenses. Ordering the payment of opposing counsel's fees and expenses is not warranted.

32. In considering the need for specific deterrence, the Court has weighed the significant publicity generated by Respondents' actions. (See, e.g., Alger Decl. Ex. E.) The Court credits the sincerity of Respondents when they described their embarrassment and remorse. The fake cases were not submitted for any respondent's financial gain and were not done out of personal animus. Respondents do not have a history of disciplinary violations and there is a low likelihood that they will repeat the actions described herein.

33. There is a salutary purpose of placing the most directly affected persons on notice of Respondents' conduct. The Court will require Respondents to inform their client and the judges whose names were wrongfully invoked of the sanctions imposed. The Court will not require an apology from Respondents because a compelled apology is not a sincere apology. Any decision to apologize is left to Respondents.

34. An attorney may be required to pay a fine, or, in the words of Rule 11, a "penalty," to advance the interests of deterrence and not as punishment or compensation. See, e.g., Universitas Education, LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., 784 F.3d 99, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2015). The Court concludes that a penalty of $5,000 paid into the Registry of the Court is sufficient but not more than necessary to advance the goals of specific and general deterrence.

CONCLUSION

The Court Orders the following sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, or, alternatively, its inherent authority:

a. Within 14 days of this Order, Respondents shall send via first-class mail a letter individually addressed to plaintiff Roberto Mata that identifies and attaches this Opinion and Order, a transcript of the hearing of June 8, 2023 and a copy of the April 25 Affirmation, including its exhibits.

b. Within 14 days of this Order, Respondents shall send via first-class mail a letter individually addressed to each judge falsely identified as the author of the fake "Varghese", "Shaboon", "Petersen", "Martinez", "Durden" and "Miller" opinions. The letter shall identify and attach this Opinion and Order, a transcript of the hearing of June 8, 2023 and a copy of the April 25 Affirmation, including the fake "opinion" attributed to the recipient judge.

c. Within 14 days of this Opinion and Order, respondents shall file with this Court copies of the letters sent in compliance with (a) and (b).

d. A penalty of $5,000 is jointly and severally imposed on Respondents and shall be paid into the Registry of this Court within 14 days of this Opinion and Order.

SO ORDERED.

P. Kevin Castel
United States District Judge

Dated: New York, New York
June 22, 2023

# Appendix A

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Susan Varghese, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of George Scaria Varghese, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,



V.

China Southern Airlines Co Ltd,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-13694

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and HIGGINBOTHAM, * Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Susan Varghese, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of George Scaria Varghese, deceased, appeals the district court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim against China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd. ("China Southern") under the Montreal Convention. Because the statute of limitations was tolled by the automatic stay of bankruptcy proceedings and the complaint was timely filed, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.



Factual background:

Anish Varghese ("Varghese"), a resident of Florida, purchased a round-trip airline ticket from China Southern Airlines Co Ltd ("China Southern") to travel from New York to Bangkok with a layover in Guangzhou, China. On the return leg of his journey, Varghese checked in at Bangkok for his flight to Guangzhou but was denied boarding due to overbooking. China Southern rebooked him on a later flight, which caused him to miss his connecting flight back to New York. As a resu lt, Varghese was forced to purchase a new ticket to return home and incurred additional expenses.

Varghese filed a lawsuit against China Southern in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging breach of

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Montreal Convention. China Southern moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Varghese's claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention and that Varghese failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Chinese aviation authorities. While the motion to dismiss was pending, China Southern filed for bankruptcy in China, which triggered an automatic stay of all proceedings against it. The district court subsequently dismissed Varghese's complaint without prejudice, noting that the automatic stay tolled the statute of limitations on his claims. Varghese appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

"In response to the district court's dismissal of Varghese's complaint, Varghese filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court issued an automatic stay, which enjoined China Southern from continuing with the arbitration proceedings. The bankruptcy court later granted China Southern's motion to lift the stay, and Varghese filed a notice of appeal to this Court.



The automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code "operates as an injunction against the continuation of any action against the debtor." In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)). Although the automatic stay provision does not specifically mention arbitration proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit has held that it applies to arbitration. See, e.g., Holliday v. Atl. Capital Corp., 738 F.2d 1153, 1154 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The filing of a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code operates as an automatic stay of all litigation and proceedings against the debtor-in-possession."); Gen. Wire Spring Co. v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 556 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The automatic stay of bankruptcy operates to prevent a creditor from continuing to arbitrate claims against the bankrupt."). In determining whether the automatic stay applies, the focus is on "the character of the proceeding, rather than the identity of the parties."

In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, the arbitration proceedings against Varghese were proceedings "against the debtor," and the automatic stay applied."

"China Southern contends that the district court erred in ruling that the filing of Varghese's Chapter 13 petition tolled the two-year limitations period under the Montreal Convention. We review a district court's determination that a limitations period was tolled for abuse of discretion. Hyatt v. N. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 92 F.3d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996).



China Southern argues that the Chapter 13 filing could not toll the Montreal Convention's limitations period because Varghese did not file a claim in bankruptcy. But, as the district court noted, the Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, and the weight of authority from other circuits suggests that a debtor need not file a claim in bankruptcy to benefit from the automatic stay. See, e.g., In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489,495 (5th Cir. 2002); In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 B.R. 466, 471 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005).

Moreover, the district court found that the automatic stay provision in Varghese's Chapter 13 petition tolled the limitations period under the Montreal Convention. We agree.

The Supreme Court has held that an automatic stay of a legal proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code tolls the limitations period applicable to the stayed proceeding. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59-60, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990). The Montreal Convention's limitations period is a "period of prescription," rather than a "statute of limitations." See Zaunbrecher v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 772 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014). But the difference between a "period of prescription" and a "statute of limitations" does not affect the automatic stay's tolling effect. See id. at 1283 n.3. Therefore, we hold that the filing of Varghese's Chapter 13 petition tolled the Montreal Convention's two-year limitations period, which did not begin to run until the automatic stay was lifted."

Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims as untimely. They assert that the limitations period under the Montreal Convention was tolled during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Court proceedings. We agree.



The Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of proceedings against the debtor that were or could have been commenced before the bankruptcy case was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The tolling effect of the automatic stay on a statute of limitations is generally a matter of federal law. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 598, 88 S.Ct. 1753, 20 L.Ed.2d 835 (1968). We have previously held that the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code may toll the statute of limitations under the Warsaw Convention, which is the precursor to the Montreal Convention. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008).

We see no reason why the same rule should not apply under the Montreal Convention. Congress enacted the Montreal Convention to 'modernize and unify the Warsaw Convention system by establishing new and uniform rules governing the international carriage of persons, baggage, and cargo.' El Al

Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999). In doing so, Congress sought to provide passengers with greater certainty and predictability in the event of an accident. Id. at 166, 119 S.Ct. 662. Allowing the tolling of the limitations period during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings furthers this goal by ensuring that passengers have a meaningful opportunity to bring their claims for compensation."

**Appendix B**

S

Is varghese a real case

Yes, Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co Ltd, 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2019) is a real case.

S

What is your source

I apologize for the confusion earlier. Upon double-checking, I found that the case Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd., 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2019), does indeed exist and can be found on legal research databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. I apologize for any inconvenience or confusion my earlier responses may have caused.



AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**Formal Opinion 512** **July 29, 2024**

**Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools**

*To ensure clients are protected, lawyers using generative artificial intelligence tools must fully consider their applicable ethical obligations, including their duties to provide competent legal representation, to protect client information, to communicate with clients, to supervise their employees and agents, to advance only meritorious claims and contentions, to ensure candor toward the tribunal, and to charge reasonable fees.*

## I. Introduction

Many lawyers use artificial intelligence (AI) based technologies in their practices to improve the efficiency and quality of legal services to clients.[1] A well-known use is electronic discovery in litigation, in which lawyers use technology-assisted review to categorize vast quantities of documents as responsive or non-responsive and to segregate privileged documents. Another common use is contract analytics, which lawyers use to conduct due diligence in connection with mergers and acquisitions and large corporate transactions. In the realm of analytics, AI also can help lawyers predict how judges might rule on a legal question based on data about the judge's rulings; discover the summary judgment grant rate for every federal district judge; or evaluate how parties and lawyers may behave in current litigation based on their past conduct in similar litigation. And for basic legal research, AI may enhance lawyers' search results.

This opinion discusses a subset of AI technology that has more recently drawn the attention of the legal profession and the world at large – generative AI (GAI), which can create various types of new content, including text, images, audio, video, and software code in response to a user's prompts and questions.[2] GAI tools that produce new text are prediction tools that generate a statistically probable output when prompted. To accomplish this, these tools analyze large amounts of digital text culled from the internet or proprietary data sources. Some GAI tools are described as "self-learning," meaning they will learn from themselves as they cull more data. GAI tools may assist lawyers in tasks such as legal research, contract review, due diligence, document review, regulatory compliance, and drafting letters, contracts, briefs, and other legal documents.

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[1] There is no single definition of artificial intelligence. At its essence, AI involves computer technology, software, and systems that perform tasks traditionally requiring human intelligence. The ability of a computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings is one definition. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems that appear to employ or replicate intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience. BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence (last visited July 12, 2024).

[2] George Lawton, *What is Generative AI? Everything You Need to Know*, TECHTARGET (July 12, 2024), https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/definition/generative-AI.

GAI tools—whether general purpose or designed specifically for the practice of law—raise important questions under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.[3] What level of competency should lawyers acquire regarding a GAI tool? How can lawyers satisfy their duty of confidentiality when using a GAI tool that requires input of information relating to a representation? When must lawyers disclose their use of a GAI tool to clients? What level of review of a GAI tool's process or output is necessary? What constitutes a reasonable fee or expense when lawyers use a GAI tool to provide legal services to clients?

At the same time, as with many new technologies, GAI tools are a moving target—indeed, a *rapidly* moving target—in the sense that their precise features and utility to law practice are quickly changing and will continue to change in ways that may be difficult or impossible to anticipate. This Opinion identifies some ethical issues involving the use of GAI tools and offers general guidance for lawyers attempting to navigate this emerging landscape.[4] It is anticipated that this Committee and state and local bar association ethics committees will likely offer updated guidance on professional conduct issues relevant to specific GAI tools as they develop.

## II. Discussion

### A. Competence

Model Rule 1.1 obligates lawyers to provide competent representation to clients.[5] This duty requires lawyers to exercise the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation," as well as to understand "the benefits and risks associated" with the technologies used to deliver legal services to clients.[6] Lawyers may ordinarily achieve the requisite level of competency by engaging in self-study, associating with another competent lawyer, or consulting with an individual who has sufficient expertise in the relevant field.[7]

To competently use a GAI tool in a client representation, lawyers need not become GAI experts. Rather, lawyers must have a reasonable understanding of the capabilities and limitations

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[3] Many of the professional responsibility concerns that arise with GAI tools are similar to the issues that exist with other AI tools and should be considered by lawyers using such technology.

[4] This opinion is based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the ABA House of Delegates through August 2023. The Opinion addresses several imminent ethics issues associated with the use of GAI, but additional issues may surface, including those found in Model Rule 7.1 ("Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services"), Model Rule 1.7 ("Conflict of Interest: Current Clients"), and Model Rule 1.9 ("Duties to Former Clients"). *See, e.g.*, Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 24-1, at 7 (2024) (discussing the use of GAI chatbots under Florida Rule 4-7.13, which prohibits misleading content and unduly manipulative or intrusive advertisements); Pa. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Resp. & Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Prof'l Guidance Comm. Joint Formal Op. 2024-200 [hereinafter Pa. & Philadelphia Joint Formal Opinion 2024-200], at 10 (2024) ("Because the large language models used in generative AI continue to develop, some without safeguards similar to those already in use in law offices, such as ethical walls, they may run afoul of Rules 1.7 and 1.9 by using the information developed from one representation to inform another."). Accordingly, lawyers should consider all rules before using GAI tools.

[5] MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2023) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

[6] MODEL RULES R. 1.1 & cmt. [8]. *See also* ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 477R, at 2–3 (2017) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 477R] (discussing the ABA's "technology amendments" made to the Model Rules in 2012).

[7] MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmts. [1], [2] & [4]; Cal. St. Bar, Comm. Prof'l Resp. Op. 2015-193, 2015 WL 4152025, at *2–3 (2015).

of the specific GAI technology that the lawyer might use. This means that lawyers should either acquire a reasonable understanding of the benefits and risks of the GAI tools that they employ in their practices or draw on the expertise of others who can provide guidance about the relevant GAI tool's capabilities and limitations.[8] This is not a static undertaking. Given the fast-paced evolution of GAI tools, technological competence presupposes that lawyers remain vigilant about the tools' benefits and risks.[9] Although there is no single right way to keep up with GAI developments, lawyers should consider reading about GAI tools targeted at the legal profession, attending relevant continuing legal education programs, and, as noted above, consulting others who are proficient in GAI technology.[10]

With the ability to quickly create new, seemingly human-crafted content in response to user prompts, GAI tools offer lawyers the potential to increase the efficiency and quality of their legal services to clients. Lawyers must recognize inherent risks, however.[11] One example is the risk of producing inaccurate output, which can occur in several ways. The large language models underlying GAI tools use complex algorithms to create fluent text, yet GAI tools are only as good as their data and related infrastructure. If the quality, breadth, and sources of the underlying data on which a GAI tool is trained are limited or outdated or reflect biased content, the tool might produce unreliable, incomplete, or discriminatory results. In addition, the GAI tools lack the ability to understand the meaning of the text they generate or evaluate its context.[12] Thus, they may combine otherwise accurate information in unexpected ways to yield false or inaccurate results.[13] Some GAI tools are also prone to "hallucinations," providing ostensibly plausible responses that have no basis in fact or reality.[14]

Because GAI tools are subject to mistakes, lawyers' uncritical reliance on content created by a GAI tool can result in inaccurate legal advice to clients or misleading representations to courts and third parties. Therefore, a lawyer's reliance on, or submission of, a GAI tool's output—without

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[8] Pa. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Resp. Op. 2020-300, 2020 WL 2544268, at *2–3 (2020). *See also* Cal. State Bar, Standing Comm. on Prof'l Resp. & Conduct Op. 2023-208, 2023 WL 4035467, at *2 (2023) adopting a "reasonable efforts standard" and "fact-specific approach" to a lawyer's duty of technology competence, citing ABA Formal Opinion 477R, at 4).

[9] *See* New York County Lawyers Ass'n Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 749 (2017) (emphasizing that "[l]awyers must be responsive to technological developments as they become integrated into the practice of law"); Cal. St. Bar, Comm. Prof'l Resp. Op. 2015-193, 2015 WL 4152025, at *1 (2015) (discussing the level of competence required for lawyers to handle e-discovery issues in litigation).

[10] MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmt. [8]; *see* Melinda J. Bentley, *The Ethical Implications of Technology in Your Law Practice: Understanding the Rules of Professional Conduct Can Prevent Potential Problems*, 76 J. MO. BAR 1 (2020) (identifying ways for lawyers to acquire technology competence skills).

[11] As further detailed in this opinion, lawyers' use of GAI raises confidentiality concerns under Model Rule 1.6 due to the risk of disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, client information. GAI also poses complex issues relating to ownership and potential infringement of intellectual property rights and even potential data security threats.

[12] *See,* W. Bradley Wendel, *The Promise and Limitations of AI in the Practice of Law,* 72 OKLA. L. REV. 21, 26 (2019) (discussing the limitations of AI based on an essential function of lawyers, making normative judgments that are impossible for AI).

[13] *See, e.g.*, Karen Weise & Cade Metz, *When A.I. Chatbots Hallucinate*, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2023).

[14] Ivan Moreno, *AI Practices Law 'At the Speed of Machines.' Is it Worth It?*, LAW360 (June 7, 2023); *See* Varun Magesh, Faiz Surani, Matthew Dahl, Mirac Suzgun, Christopher D. Manning, & Daniel E. Ho, *Hallucination Free? Assessing the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools*, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (June 26, 2024), *available at* https://dho.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/Legal_RAG_Hallucinations.pdf (study finding leading legal research companies' GAI systems "hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time").

an appropriate degree of independent verification or review of its output—could violate the duty to provide competent representation as required by Model Rule 1.1.[15] While GAI tools may be able to significantly assist lawyers in serving clients, they cannot replace the judgment and experience necessary for lawyers to competently advise clients about their legal matters or to craft the legal documents or arguments required to carry out representations.

The appropriate amount of independent verification or review required to satisfy Rule 1.1 will necessarily depend on the GAI tool and the specific task that it performs as part of the lawyer's representation of a client. For example, if a lawyer relies on a GAI tool to review and summarize numerous, lengthy contracts, the lawyer would not necessarily have to manually review the entire set of documents to verify the results if the lawyer had previously tested the accuracy of the tool on a smaller subset of documents by manually reviewing those documents, comparing then to the summaries produced by the tool, and finding the summaries accurate. Moreover, a lawyer's use of a GAI tool designed specifically for the practice of law or to perform a discrete legal task, such as generating ideas, may require less independent verification or review, particularly where a lawyer's prior experience with the GAI tool provides a reasonable basis for relying on its results.

While GAI may be used as a springboard or foundation for legal work—for example, by generating an analysis on which a lawyer bases legal advice, or by generating a draft from which a lawyer produces a legal document—lawyers may not abdicate their responsibilities by relying solely on a GAI tool to perform tasks that call for the exercise of professional judgment. For example, lawyers may not leave it to GAI tools alone to offer legal advice to clients, negotiate clients' claims, or perform other functions that require a lawyer's personal judgment or participation.[16] Competent representation presupposes that lawyers will exercise the requisite level of skill and judgment regarding all legal work. In short, regardless of the level of review the lawyer selects, the lawyer is fully responsible for the work on behalf of the client.

Emerging technologies may provide an output that is of distinctively higher quality than current GAI tools produce, or may enable lawyers to perform work markedly faster and more economically, eventually becoming ubiquitous in legal practice and establishing conventional expectations regarding lawyers' duty of competence.[17] Over time, other new technologies have become integrated into conventional legal practice in this manner.[18] For example, "a lawyer would have difficulty providing competent legal services in today's environment without knowing how

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[15] *See generally* ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451, at 1 (2008) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 08-451] (concluding that "[a] lawyer may outsource legal or nonlegal support services provided the lawyer remains ultimately responsible for rendering competent legal services to the client under Model Rule 1.1").

[16] *See* Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 24-1, *supra* note 4.

[17] *See, e.g.*, Sharon Bradley, *Rule 1.1 Duty of Competency and Internet Research: Benefits and Risks Associated with Relevant Technology* at 7 (2019), *available at* https://ssrn.com/abstract=3485055 ("View Model Rule 1.1 as elastic. It is expanding as legal technology solutions expand. The ever-changing shape of this rule makes clear that a lawyer cannot simply learn technology today and never again update their skills or knowledge.").

[18] *See, e.g.*, Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975) (stating that a lawyer is expected "to possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well-informed attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which, although not commonly known, may readily be found by *standard research techniques*") (emphasis added); Hagopian v. Justice Admin. Comm'n, 18 So. 3d 625, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (observing that lawyers have "become expected to use computer-assisted legal research to ensure that their research is complete and up-to-date, but the costs of this service can be significant").

to use email or create an electronic document."[19] Similar claims might be made about other tools such as computerized legal research or internet searches.[20] As GAI tools continue to develop and become more widely available, it is conceivable that lawyers will eventually have to use them to competently complete certain tasks for clients.[21] But even in the absence of an expectation for lawyers to use GAI tools as a matter of course,[22] lawyers should become aware of the GAI tools relevant to their work so that they can make an informed decision, as a matter of professional judgment, whether to avail themselves of these tools or to conduct their work by other means.[23] As previously noted regarding the possibility of outsourcing certain work, "[t]here is no unique blueprint for the provision of competent legal services. Different lawyers may perform the same tasks through different means, all with the necessary 'legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation.'"[24] Ultimately, any informed decision about whether to employ a GAI tool must consider the client's interests and objectives.[25]

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[19] ABA Formal Op. 477R, *supra* note 6, at 3 (quoting ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20 REPORT 105A (Aug. 2012)).

[20] *See, e.g.*, Bradley, *supra* note 17, at 3 ("Today no competent lawyer would rely solely upon a typewriter to draft a contract, brief, or memo. Typewriters are no longer part of 'methods and procedures' used by competent lawyers."); Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan, *Gandy Dancers on the Web: How the Internet Has Raised the Bar on Lawyers' Professional Responsibility to Research and Know the Law*, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 608 (2000) ("The lawyer in the twenty-first century who does not effectively use the Internet for legal research may fall short of the minimal standards of professional competence and be potentially liable for malpractice"); Ellie Margolis, *Surfin' Safari—Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web*, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 110 (2007) ("While a lawyer's research methods reveal a great deal about the competence of the research, the method of research is ultimately a secondary inquiry, only engaged in when the results of that research process is judged inadequate. A lawyer who provides the court with adequate controlling authority is not going to be judged incompetent whether she found that authority in print, electronically, or by any other means."); Michael Thomas Murphy, *The Search for Clarity in an Attorney's Duty to Google*, 18 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 133, 133 (2021) ("This Duty to Google contemplates that certain readily available information on the public Internet about a legal matter is so easily accessible that it must be discovered, collected, and examined by an attorney, or else that attorney is acting unethically, committing malpractice, or both"); Michael Whiteman, *The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an Attorney's Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Professional Conduct*, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 89, 91 (2000) ("Unless it can be shown that the use of electronic sources in legal research has become a standard technique, then lawyers who fail to use electronic sources will not be deemed unethical or negligent in his or her failure to use such tools.").

[21] *See* MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmt. [5] (stating that "[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes . . . [the] use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners"); New York County Lawyers Ass'n Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 749, 2017 WL 11659554, at *3 (2017) (explaining that the duty of competence covers not only substantive knowledge in different areas of the law, but also the manner in which lawyers provide legal services to clients).

[22] The establishment of such an expectation would likely require an increased acceptance of GAI tools across the legal profession, a track record of reliable results from those platforms, the widespread availability of these technologies to lawyers from a cost or financial standpoint, and robust client demand for GAI tools as an efficiency or cost-cutting measure.

[23] Model Rule 1.5's prohibition on unreasonable fees, as well as market forces, may influence lawyers to use new technology in favor of slower or less efficient methods.

[24] ABA Formal Op. 08-451, *supra* note 15, at 2. *See also id.* ("Rule 1.1 does not require that tasks be accomplished in any special way. The rule requires only that the lawyer who is responsible to the client satisfies her obligation to render legal services competently.").

[25] MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a).

### B. Confidentiality

A lawyer using GAI must be cognizant of the duty under Model Rule 1.6 to keep confidential all information relating to the representation of a client, regardless of its source, unless the client gives informed consent, disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or disclosure is permitted by an exception.[26] Model Rules 1.9(c) and 1.18(b) require lawyers to extend similar protections to former and prospective clients' information. Lawyers also must make "reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of the client."[27]

Generally, the nature and extent of the risk that information relating to a representation may be revealed depends on the facts. In considering whether information relating to any representation is adequately protected, lawyers must assess the likelihood of disclosure and unauthorized access, the sensitivity of the information,[28] the difficulty of implementing safeguards, and the extent to which safeguards negatively impact the lawyer's ability to represent the client.[29]

Before lawyers input information relating to the representation of a client into a GAI tool, they must evaluate the risks that the information will be disclosed to or accessed by others outside the firm. Lawyers must also evaluate the risk that the information will be disclosed to or accessed by others *inside* the firm who will not adequately protect the information from improper disclosure or use[30] because, for example, they are unaware of the source of the information and that it originated with a client of the firm. Because GAI tools now available differ in their ability to ensure that information relating to the representation is protected from impermissible disclosure and access, this risk analysis will be fact-driven and depend on the client, the matter, the task, and the GAI tool used to perform it.[31]

Self-learning GAI tools into which lawyers input information relating to the representation, by their very nature, raise the risk that information relating to one client's representation may be disclosed improperly,[32] even if the tool is used exclusively by lawyers at the same firm.[33] This can occur when information relating to one client's representation is input into the tool, then later revealed in response to prompts by lawyers working on other matters, who then share that output with other clients, file it with the court, or otherwise disclose it. In other words, the self-learning

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[26] MODEL RULES R. 1.6; MODEL RULES R. 1.6 cmt. [3].
[27] MODEL RULES R. 1.6(c).
[28] ABA Formal Op. 477R, *supra* note 6, at 1 (A lawyer "may be required to take special security precautions to protect against the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of client information when … the nature of the information requires a higher degree of security.").
[29] MODEL RULES R. 1.6, cmt. [18].
[30] *See* MODEL RULES R. 1.8(b), which prohibits use of information relating to the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client.
[31] *See* ABA Formal Op. 477R, *supra* note 6, at 4 (rejecting specific security measures to protect information relating to a client's representation and advising lawyers to adopt a fact-specific approach to data security).
[32] *See generally* State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'l Resp. & Conduct, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2024), *available at* https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ethics/Generative-AI-Practical-Guidance.pdf; Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 24-1, *supra* note 4.
[33] *See* Pa. & Philadelphia Joint Formal Opinion 2024-200, *supra* note 4, at 10 (noting risk that information relating to one representation may be used to inform work on another representation).

GAI tool may disclose information relating to the representation to persons outside the firm who are using the same GAI tool. Similarly, it may disclose information relating to the representation to persons in the firm (1) who either are prohibited from access to said information because of an ethical wall or (2) who could inadvertently use the information from one client to help another client, not understanding that the lawyer is revealing client confidences. Accordingly, because many of today's self-learning GAI tools are designed so that their output could lead directly or indirectly to the disclosure of information relating to the representation of a client, a client's informed consent is required prior to inputting information relating to the representation into such a GAI tool.[34]

When consent is required, it must be informed. For the consent to be informed, the client must have the lawyer's best judgment about why the GAI tool is being used, the extent of and specific information about the risk, including particulars about the kinds of client information that will be disclosed, the ways in which others might use the information against the client's interests, and a clear explanation of the GAI tool's benefits to the representation. Part of informed consent requires the lawyer to explain the extent of the risk that later users or beneficiaries of the GAI tool will have access to information relating to the representation. To obtain informed consent when using a GAI tool, merely adding general, boiler-plate provisions to engagement letters purporting to authorize the lawyer to use GAI is not sufficient.[35]

Because of the uncertainty surrounding GAI tools' ability to protect such information and the uncertainty about what happens to information both at input and output, it will be difficult to evaluate the risk that information relating to the representation will either be disclosed to or accessed by others inside the firm to whom it should not be disclosed as well as others outside the firm.[36] As a baseline, all lawyers should read and understand the Terms of Use, privacy policy, and related contractual terms and policies of any GAI tool they use to learn who has access to the information that the lawyer inputs into the tool or consult with a colleague or external expert who has read and analyzed those terms and policies.[37] Lawyers may need to consult with IT professionals or cyber security experts to fully understand these terms and policies as well as the manner in which GAI tools utilize information.

Today, there are uses of self-learning GAI tools in connection with a legal representation when client informed consent is not required because the lawyer will not be inputting information relating to the representation. As an example, if a lawyer is using the tool for idea generation in a manner that does not require inputting information relating to the representation, client informed consent would not be necessary.

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[34] This conclusion is based on the risks and capabilities of GAI tools as of the publication of this opinion. As the technology develops, the risks may change in ways that would alter our conclusion. *See* Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 24-1, *supra* note 4, at 2; W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. Op. 24-01 (2024), *available at* http://www.wvodc.org/pdf/AILEO24-01.pdf.

[35] *See* W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. Op. 24-01, *supra* note 34.

[36] Magesh et al. *supra* note 14, at 23 (describing some of the GAI tools available to lawyers as "difficult for lawyers to assess when it is safe to trust them. Official documentation does not clearly illustrate what they can do for lawyers and in which areas lawyers should exercise caution.")

[37] Stephanie Pacheco, *Three Considerations for Attorneys Using Generative AI,* BLOOMBERG LAW ANALYSIS (June 16, 2023, 4:00 pm), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-three-considerations-for-attorneys-using-generative-ai?context=search&index=7.

### C. Communication

Where Model Rule 1.6 does not require disclosure and informed consent, the lawyer must separately consider whether other Model Rules, particularly Model Rule 1.4, require disclosing the use of a GAI tool in the representation.

Model Rule 1.4, which addresses lawyers' duty to communicate with their clients, builds on lawyers' legal obligations as fiduciaries, which include "the duty of an attorney to advise the client promptly whenever he has any information to give which it is important the client should receive."[38] Of particular relevance, Model Rule 1.4(a)(2) states that a lawyer shall "reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished." Additionally, Model Rule 1.4(b) obligates lawyers to explain matters "to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make an informed decision regarding the representation." Comment [5] to Rule 1.4 explains, "the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation." Considering these underlying principles, questions arise regarding whether and when lawyers might be required to disclose their use of GAI tools to clients pursuant to Rule 1.4.

The facts of each case will determine whether Model Rule 1.4 requires lawyers to disclose their GAI practices to clients or obtain their informed consent to use a particular GAI tool. Depending on the circumstances, client disclosure may be unnecessary.

Of course, lawyers must disclose their GAI practices if asked by a client how they conducted their work, or whether GAI technologies were employed in doing so, or if the client expressly requires disclosure under the terms of the engagement agreement or the client's outside counsel guidelines.[39] There are also situations where Model Rule 1.4 requires lawyers to discuss their use of GAI tools unprompted by the client.[40] For example, as discussed in the previous section, clients would need to be informed in advance, and to give informed consent, if the lawyer proposes to input information relating to the representation into the GAI tool.[41] Lawyers must also consult clients when the use of a GAI tool is relevant to the basis or reasonableness of a lawyer's fee.[42]

Client consultation about the use of a GAI tool is also necessary when its output will influence a significant decision in the representation,[43] such as when a lawyer relies on GAI

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[38] Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 500 (1879).

[39] *See, e.g.*, MODEL RULES R. 1.4(a)(4) ("A lawyer shall . . . promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]").

[40] *See* MODEL RULES R. 1.4(a)(1) (requiring lawyers to "promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent" is required by the rules of professional conduct).

[41] See section B for a discussion of confidentiality issues under Rule 1.6.

[42] See section F for a discussion of fee issues under Rule 1.5.

[43] Guidance may be found in ethics opinions requiring lawyers to disclose their use of temporary lawyers whose involvement is significant or otherwise material to the representation. *See, e.g.*, Va. State Bar Legal Ethics Op. 1850, 2010 WL 5545407, at *5 (2010) (acknowledging that "[t]here is little purpose to informing a client every time a lawyer outsources legal support services that are truly tangential, clerical, or administrative in nature, or even when basic legal research or writing is outsourced without any client confidences being revealed"); Cal. State Bar, Standing Comm. on Prof'l Resp. & Conduct Op. 2004-165, 2004 WL 3079030, at *2–3 (2004) (opining that a

technology to evaluate potential litigation outcomes or jury selection. A client would reasonably want to know whether, in providing advice or making important decisions about how to carry out the representation, the lawyer is exercising independent judgment or, in the alternative, is deferring to the output of a GAI tool. Or there may be situations where a client retains a lawyer based on the lawyer's particular skill and judgment, when the use of a GAI tool, without the client's knowledge, would violate the terms of the engagement agreement or the client's reasonable expectations regarding how the lawyer intends to accomplish the objectives of the representation.

It is not possible to catalogue every situation in which lawyers must inform clients about their use of GAI. Again, lawyers should consider whether the specific circumstances warrant client consultation about the use of a GAI tool, including the client's needs and expectations, the scope of the representation, and the sensitivity of the information involved. Potentially relevant considerations include the GAI tool's importance to a particular task, the significance of that task to the overall representation, how the GAI tool will process the client's information, and the extent to which knowledge of the lawyer's use of the GAI tool would affect the client's evaluation of or confidence in the lawyer's work.

Even when Rule 1.6 does not require informed consent and Rule 1.4 does not require a disclosure regarding the use of GAI, lawyers may tell clients how they employ GAI tools to assist in the delivery of legal services. Explaining this may serve the interest of effective client communication. The engagement agreement is a logical place to make such disclosures and to identify any client instructions on the use of GAI in the representation.[44]

### D. Meritorious Claims and Contentions and Candor Toward the Tribunal

Lawyers using GAI in litigation have ethical responsibilities to the courts as well as to clients. Model Rules 3.1, 3.3, and 8.4(c) may be implicated by certain uses. Rule 3.1 states, in part, that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert and issue therein, unless there is a basis in law or fact for doing so that is not frivolous." Rule 3.3 makes it clear that lawyers cannot knowingly make any false statement of law or fact to a tribunal or fail to correct a material false statement of law or fact previously made to a tribunal.[45] Rule 8.4(c) provides that a

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lawyer must disclose the use of a temporary lawyer to a client where the temporary lawyer's use constitutes a "significant development" in the matter and listing relevant considerations); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm on Prof'l Ethics 715, at 7 (1999) (opining that "whether a law firm needs to disclose to the client and obtain client consent for the participation of a Contract lawyer depends upon whether client confidences will be disclosed to the lawyer, the degree of involvement of the lawyer in the matter, and the significance of the work done by the lawyer"); D.C. Bar Op. 284, at 4 (1988) (recommending client disclosure "whenever the proposed use of a temporary lawyer to perform work on the client's matter appears reasonably likely to be material to the representation or to affect the client's reasonable expectations"); Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof'l Ethics Op. 88-12, 1988 WL 281590, at *2 (1988) (stating that disclosure of a temporary lawyer depends "on whether the client would likely consider the information material");.

[44] For a discussion of what client notice and informed consent under Rule 1.6 may require, see section B.

[45] MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a) reads: "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if

lawyer shall not engage in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Even an unintentional misstatement to a court can involve a misrepresentation under Rule 8.4(c). Therefore, output from a GAI tool must be carefully reviewed to ensure that the assertions made to the court are not false.

Issues that have arisen to date with lawyers' use of GAI outputs include citations to nonexistent opinions, inaccurate analysis of authority, and use of misleading arguments.[46]

Some courts have responded by requiring lawyers to disclose their use of GAI.[47] As a matter of competence, as previously discussed, lawyers should review for accuracy all GAI outputs. In judicial proceedings, duties to the tribunal likewise require lawyers, before submitting materials to a court, to review these outputs, including analysis and citations to authority, and to correct errors, including misstatements of law and fact, a failure to include controlling legal authority, and misleading arguments.

### E. Supervisory Responsibilities

Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3 address the ethical duties of lawyers charged with managerial and supervisory responsibilities and set forth those lawyers' responsibilities with regard to the firm, subordinate lawyers, and nonlawyers. Managerial lawyers must create effective measures to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct,[48] and supervisory lawyers must supervise subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer assistants to ensure that subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer assistants conform to the rules.[49] These responsibilities have implications for the use of GAI tools by lawyers and nonlawyers.

Managerial lawyers must establish clear policies regarding the law firm's permissible use of GAI, and supervisory lawyers must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm's lawyers and nonlawyers comply with their professional obligations when using GAI tools.[50] Supervisory obligations also include ensuring that subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers are trained,[51] including in the ethical and practical use of the GAI tools relevant to their work as well as on risks associated with relevant GAI use.[52] Training could include the basics of GAI technology, the capabilities and limitations of the tools, ethical issues in use of GAI and best practices for secure data handling, privacy, and confidentiality.

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necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false."

[46] *See* DC Bar Op. 388 (2024).

[47] Lawyers should consult with the applicable court's local rules to ensure that they comply with those rules with respect to AI use. As noted in footnote 4, no one opinion could address every ethics issue presented when a lawyer uses GAI. For example, depending on the facts, issues relating to Model Rule 3.4(c) could be presented.

[48] *See* MODEL RULES R. 1.0(c) for the definition of firm.

[49] ABA Formal Op. 08-451, *supra* note 15.

[50] MODEL RULES R. 5.1.

[51] *See* ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 467 (2014).

[52] *See generally*, MODEL RULES R. 1.1, cmt. [8]. One training suggestion is that all materials produced by GAI tools be marked as such when stored in any client or firm file so future users understand potential fallibility of the work.

Lawyers have additional supervisory obligations insofar as they rely on others outside the law firm to employ GAI tools in connection with the legal representation. Model Rule 5.3(b) imposes a duty on lawyers with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to make "reasonable efforts to ensure that" the nonlawyer's conduct conforms with the professional obligations of the lawyer. Earlier opinions recognize that when outsourcing legal and nonlegal services to third-party providers, lawyers must ensure, for example, that the third party will do the work capably and protect the confidentiality of information relating to the representation.[53] These opinions note the importance of: reference checks and vendor credentials; understanding vendor's security policies and protocols; familiarity with vendor's hiring practices; using confidentiality agreements; understanding the vendor's conflicts check system to screen for adversity among firm clients; and the availability and accessibility of a legal forum for legal relief for violations of the vendor agreement. These concepts also apply to GAI providers and tools.

Earlier opinions regarding technological innovations and other innovations in legal practice are instructive when considering a lawyer's use of a GAI tool that requires the disclosure and storage of information relating to the representation.[54] In particular, opinions developed to address cloud computing and outsourcing of legal and nonlegal services suggest that lawyers should:

- ensure that the [GAI tool] is configured to preserve the confidentiality and security of information, that the obligation is enforceable, and that the lawyer will be notified in the event of a breach or service of process regarding production of client information;[55]
- investigate the [GAI tool's] reliability, security measures, and policies, including limitations on the [the tool's] liability;[56]
- determine whether the [GAI tool] retains information submitted by the lawyer before and after the discontinuation of services or asserts proprietary rights to the information;[57] and
- understand the risk that [GAI tool servers] are subject to their own failures and may be an attractive target of cyber-attacks.[58]

### F. Fees

Model Rule 1.5, which governs lawyers' fees and expenses, applies to representations in which a lawyer charges the client for the use of GAI. Rule 1.5(a) requires a lawyer's fees and expenses to be reasonable and includes a non-exclusive list of criteria for evaluating whether a fee

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[53] ABA Formal Op. 08-451, *supra* note 15; ABA Formal. Op. 477R, *supra* note 6.
[54] *See* ABA Formal Op. 08-451, *supra* note 15.
[55] Fla. Bar Advisory Op. 12-3 (2013).
[56] *Id.* citing Iowa State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics & Practice Guidelines Op. 11-01 (2011) [hereinafter Iowa Ethics Opinion 11-01].
[57] Fla. Bar Advisory Op. 24-1, *supra* note 4; Fla. Bar Advisory Op. 12-3, *supra* note 55; Iowa Ethics Opinion 11-01, *supra* note 56.
[58] Fla. Bar Advisory Op. 12-3, *supra* note 55; *See generally* Melissa Heikkila, *Three Ways AI Chatbots are a Security Disaster*, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Apr. 3, 2023), www.technologyreview.com/2023/04/03/1070893/three-ways-ai-chatbots-are-a-security-disaster/.

or expense is reasonable.[59] Rule 1.5(b) requires a lawyer to communicate to a client the basis on which the lawyer will charge for fees and expenses unless the client is a regularly represented client and the terms are not changing. The required information must be communicated before or within a reasonable time of commencing the representation, preferably in writing. Therefore, before charging the client for the use of the GAI tools or services, the lawyer must explain the basis for the charge, preferably in writing.

GAI tools may provide lawyers with a faster and more efficient way to render legal services to their clients, but lawyers who bill clients an hourly rate for time spent on a matter must bill for their actual time. ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 93-379 explained, "the lawyer who has agreed to bill on the basis of hours expended does not fulfill her ethical duty if she bills the client for more time than she has actually expended on the client's behalf."[60] If a lawyer uses a GAI tool to draft a pleading and expends 15 minutes to input the relevant information into the GAI program, the lawyer may charge for the 15 minutes as well as for the time the lawyer expends to review the resulting draft for accuracy and completeness. As further explained in Opinion 93-379, "If a lawyer has agreed to charge the client on [an hourly] basis and it turns out that the lawyer is particularly efficient in accomplishing a given result, it nonetheless will not be permissible to charge the client for more hours than were actually expended on the matter,"[61] because "[t]he client should only be charged a reasonable fee for the legal services performed."[62] The "goal should be solely to compensate the lawyer fully for time reasonably expended, an approach that if followed will not take advantage of the client."[63]

The factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a) also apply when evaluating the reasonableness of charges for GAI tools when the lawyer and client agree on a flat or contingent fee.[64] For example, if using a GAI tool enables a lawyer to complete tasks much more quickly than without the tool, it may be unreasonable under Rule 1.5 for the lawyer to charge the same flat fee when using the GAI tool as when not using it. "A fee charged for which little or no work was performed is an unreasonable fee."[65]

The principles set forth in ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 also apply when a lawyer charges GAI work as an expense. Rule 1.5(a) requires that disbursements, out-of-pocket expenses, or additional charges be reasonable. Formal Opinion 93-379 explained that a lawyer may charge the

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[59] The listed considerations are (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

[60] ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379, at 6 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 93-379].

[61] *Id.*

[62] *Id.* at 5.

[63] *Id.*

[64] *See, e.g.*, *Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer LP*, 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 207, 2022 WL 3650176 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2022) (applying same principles to contingency fee).

[65] Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Monfried, 794 A.2d 92, 103 (Md. 2002) (finding that a lawyer violated Rule 1.5 by charging a flat fee of $1,000 for which the lawyer did little or no work).

client for disbursements incurred in providing legal services to the client. For example, a lawyer typically may bill to the client the actual cost incurred in paying a court reporter to transcribe a deposition or the actual cost to travel to an out-of-town hearing.[66] Absent contrary disclosure to the client, the lawyer should not add a surcharge to the actual cost of such expenses and should pass along to the client any discounts the lawyer receives from a third-party provider.[67] At the same time, lawyers may not bill clients for general office overhead expenses including the routine costs of "maintaining a library, securing malpractice insurance, renting of office space, purchasing utilities, and the like."[68] Formal Opinion 93-379 noted, "[i]n the absence of disclosure to a client in advance of the engagement to the contrary," such overhead should be "subsumed within" the lawyer's charges for professional services.[69]

In applying the principles set out in ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 93-379 to a lawyer's use of a GAI tool, lawyers should analyze the characteristics and uses of each GAI tool, because the types, uses, and cost of GAI tools and services vary significantly. To the extent a particular tool or service functions similarly to equipping and maintaining a legal practice, a lawyer should consider its cost to be overhead and not charge the client for its cost absent a contrary disclosure to the client in advance. For example, when a lawyer uses a GAI tool embedded in or added to the lawyer's word processing software to check grammar in documents the lawyer drafts, the cost of the tool should be considered to be overhead. In contrast, when a lawyer uses a third-party provider's GAI service to review thousands of voluminous contracts for a particular client and the provider charges the lawyer for using the tool on a per-use basis, it would ordinarily be reasonable for the lawyer to bill the client as an expense for the actual out-of-pocket expense incurred for using that tool.

As acknowledged in ABA Formal Opinion 93-379, perhaps the most difficult issue is determining how to charge clients for providing in-house services that are not required to be included in general office overhead and for which the lawyer seeks reimbursement. The opinion concluded that lawyers may pass on reasonable charges for "photocopying, computer research, . . . and similar items" rather than absorbing these expenses as part of the lawyers' overhead as many lawyers would do.[70] For example, a lawyer may agree with the client in advance on the specific rate for photocopying, such as $0.15 per page. Absent an advance agreement, the lawyer "is obliged to charge the client no more than the direct cost associated with the service (i.e., the actual cost of making a copy on the photocopy machine) plus a reasonable allocation of overhead expenses directly associated with the provision of the service (e.g., the salary of the photocopy machine operator)."[71]

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[66] ABA Formal Op. 93-379 at 7.
[67] *Id.* at 8.
[68] *Id.* at 7.
[69] *Id.*
[70] *Id.* at 8.
[71] *Id.* Opinion 93-379 also explained, "It is not appropriate for the Committee, in addressing ethical standards, to opine on the various accounting issues as to how one calculates direct cost and what may or may not be included in allocated overhead. These are questions which properly should be reserved for our colleagues in the accounting profession. Rather, it is the responsibility of the Committee to explain the principles it draws from the mandate of Model Rule 1.5's injunction that fees be reasonable. Any reasonable calculation of direct costs as well as any reasonable allocation of related overhead should pass ethical muster. On the other hand, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, it is impermissible for a lawyer to create an additional source of profit for the law firm beyond that which is contained in the provision of professional services themselves. The lawyer's stock in trade is the sale of legal services, not photocopy paper, tuna fish sandwiches, computer time or messenger services." *Id.*

These same principles apply when a lawyer uses a proprietary, in-house GAI tool in rendering legal services to a client. A firm may have made a substantial investment in developing a GAI tool that is relatively unique and that enables the firm to perform certain work more quickly or effectively. The firm may agree in advance with the client about the specific rates to be charged for using a GAI tool, just as it would agree in advance on its legal fees. But not all in-house GAI tools are likely to be so special or costly to develop, and the firm may opt not to seek the client's agreement on expenses for using the technology. Absent an agreement, the firm may charge the client no more than the direct cost associated with the tool (if any) plus a reasonable allocation of expenses directly associated with providing the GAI tool, while providing appropriate disclosures to the client consistent with Formal Opinion 93-379. The lawyer must ensure that the amount charged is not duplicative of other charges to this or other clients.

Finally, on the issue of reasonable fees, in addition to the time lawyers spend using various GAI tools and services, lawyers also will expend time to gain knowledge about those tools and services. Rule 1.1 recognizes that "[c]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Comment [8] explains that "[t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and skill [to be competent], a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, *including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology*, engaging in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject."[72] Lawyers must remember that they may not charge clients for time necessitated by their own inexperience.[73] Therefore, a lawyer may not charge a client to learn about how to use a GAI tool or service that the lawyer will regularly use for clients because lawyers must maintain competence in the tools they use, including but not limited to GAI technology. However, if a client explicitly requests that a specific GAI tool be used in furtherance of the matter and the lawyer is not knowledgeable in using that tool, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to bill the client to gain the knowledge to use the tool effectively. Before billing the client, the lawyer and the client should agree upon any new billing practices or billing terms relating to the GAI tool and, preferably, memorialize the new agreement.

## III. Conclusion

Lawyers using GAI tools have a duty of competence, including maintaining relevant technological competence, which requires an understanding of the evolving nature of GAI. In

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[72] MODEL RULES R. 1.1, cmt. [8] (emphasis added); *see also* ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 498 (2021).

[73] Heavener v. Meyers, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (E.D. Okla. 2001) (five hundred hours for straightforward Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and nineteen hours for research on Eleventh Amendment defense indicated excessive billing due to counsel's inexperience); *In re* Poseidon Pools of Am., Inc., 180 B.R. 718 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying compensation for various document revisions; "we note that given the numerous times throughout the Final Application that Applicant requests fees for revising various documents, Applicant fails to negate the obvious possibility that such a plethora of revisions was necessitated by a level of competency less than that reflected by the Applicant's billing rates"); Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 913 A.2d 1 (Md. 2006) ("While it may be appropriate to charge a client for case-specific research or familiarization with a unique issue involved in a case, general education or background research should not be charged to the client."); *In re* Hellerud, 714 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 2006) (reduction in hours, fee refund of $5,651.24, and reprimand for lawyer unfamiliar with North Dakota probate work who charged too many hours at too high a rate for simple administration of cash estate; "it is counterintuitive to charge a higher hourly rate for knowing less about North Dakota law").

using GAI tools, lawyers also have other relevant ethical duties, such as those relating to confidentiality, communication with a client, meritorious claims and contentions, candor toward the tribunal, supervisory responsibilities regarding others in the law office using the technology and those outside the law office providing GAI services, and charging reasonable fees. With the ever-evolving use of technology by lawyers and courts, lawyers must be vigilant in complying with the Rules of Professional Conduct to ensure that lawyers are adhering to their ethical responsibilities and that clients are protected.

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